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19. Mr. Homer filed a Motion for Relief from the Stay with the bankruptcy court. 
Affidavit of John Holt CJ[ 18. 
20. The bankruptcy trustee and Jarvis's other creditors rigorously challenged Mr. 
Horner's efforts to get the Highwillow Property removed from the bankruptcy estate, thereby 
adding additional time to the process. Affidavit of John Holt CJ[ 19. 
21. On July 24, 2009, the bankruptcy judge, the Honorable Jim D. Pappas, issued an 
Order Granting Relief from the Automatic Stay thereby releasing the Highwillow Property from 
the stay. Affidavit of John HoltCJ[ 20. 
22. Stewart entered into negotiations with New Phase Investments, LLC on behalf of 
Plaintiffs to get the issue of lien priority resolved. Affidavit of John Holt CJ[ 21. 
23. The negotiations were not fruitful. Affidavit of John Holt CJ[ 22. 
24. On February 1, 2010, Mr. Horner filed Bonneville County Case No. CV-2010-624 
on behalf of Plaintiffs seeking to foreclose Plaintiffs' deed of trust and seeking a determination 
that Plaintiffs held a superior interest in the Highwillow Property. Affidavit of John Holt CJ[ 23. 
25. On February 3, 2010, New Phase Investments, LLC filed a Bonneville County 
Case No. CV-2010-651 seeking to foreclose its security in the High willow Property claiming, 
among other things, that it held an interest superior to Plaintiffs. Affidavit of John Holt CJ[ 24. 
26. The February 1, 2010 case (Case No. CV-2010-624) was dismissed, and the 
parties proceeded to litigate the priority of the interests in the High willow Property under Case 
No. CV -2010-651 (the "Claims Litigation"). Affidavit of John Holt CJ[ 25. 
27. The litigation is still ongoing in the Claims Litigation, and the appeals are not 
complete. Affidavit of John Holtlj[~[ 26-28. 
III. 
FACTS PROVIDED IN PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVITS BUT IGNORED BY PLAINTIFF 
28. The Title Policy gives Stewart in its sole discretion the right and the ability to 
pursue litigation to a final determination and pursue all appeals to completion. Affidavit of 
Darrin Hebdon Exhibit A- Title Policy Conditions§ 5(c). 
29. The Title Policy does not allow any claims against Stewart for loss or damage to 
an insured until after a final determination in a court of competent jurisdiction and after all 
appeals. Affidavit of Darrin Hebdon Exhibit A- Title Policy Conditions§ 9(b). 
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30. Stewart has no obligation or duty to pay an insured under the Title Policy until 
after a final determination of litigation and completion of all appeals. Affidavit of Darrin Hebdon 
Exhibit A- Title Policy Conditions§§ 5(c) and 9(b). 
IV. 
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents 
on file with the court ... demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Brewer v. Washing RSA No. 8 Ltd. P'ship, 145 Idaho 
735, 738, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 
102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) (citing LR.C.P. 56( c)). The moving party bears the burden of 
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as 
matter of law. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy, Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). 
Evidence should be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Badell v. 
Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)), meaning summary judgment is improper 
"if conflicting inferences could be drawn from the record and reasonable people might reach 
different conclusions." Thomas, 138 Idaho at 205. 
v. 
ARGUMENT 
"Insurance policies are a contract between the insurer and the insured." Mortensen v. 
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, ***, 235 P.3d 387, 392 (2010). "If the policy at issue 
does not appear ambiguous on its face, and if neither party asserts that it contains an ambiguity," 
then the court must apply the plain meaning of the words used. /d. 
1. The Title Policy Clearly Provides that Stewart has the Right to Defend or Pursue 
Litigation Involving an Insured to a Final Determination, Including Any Appeals. 
The Title Policy grants Stewart wide discretion to defend, pursue, and appeal actions 
brought on behalf of or against an insured. Section 5(c) of the "Conditions" portion of the Title 
Policy provides as follows: 
Whenever the Company brings an action or asserts a defense as required or 
permitted by this policy, the Company may pursue the litigation to a final 
determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and it expressly reserves the 
right, in its sole discretion, to appeal any adverse judgment or order. 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-S 11 
Title Policy Conditions§ 5(c) (emphasis added). 
The terms of the Title Policy are clear and unambiguous. Stewart has the right to proceed 
to a final determination and pursue any appeals brought by third parties against the insured's 
claim of title. Not only does Stewart in its sole discretion have the right to complete the claims 
litigation and pursue any appeals in the claims litigation, but also Plaintiffs have no claim against 
Stewart until such time as the litigation is completed and any appeals are finished. 
2. Under the Title Policy, Stewart has No Liability for Plaintiffs' Losses or Damages Until 
After a Final Determination of Any Litigation and After Any Appeals. 
The Title Policy clearly defines when Stewart incurs an obligation to pay an insured for 
loss or damage. Section 9 "Limitation of Liability" under the Conditions portion of the Title 
Policy provides: 
In the event of any litigation, including litigation by the Company or with the 
company's consent, the Company shall have no liability for loss or damage until 
there has been a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and 
disposition of all appeals, adverse to the Title or to the lien of the Insured 
Mortgage, as insured. 
Title Policy Conditions§ 9(b) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' entire lawsuit, and thus their present 
motion for summary judgment, directly ignores the plain language of Section 9(b) of the 
Conditions portion of the Title Policy. 
Plaintiffs make a bald and unsupported claim that the Title Policy "did not give Stewart 
the right or ability to withhold payment pursuant to the Policy until after" the litigation had been 
fully determined. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum p. 4 ~[ 9. The claim has no basis. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not asserted that the Title Policy contains any ambiguity. 
The terms of the Title Policy are clear and unambiguous - Stewart holds absolutely no liability 
for loss or damage until after a final determination and after disposition of all appeals. If neither 
party asserts that the Title Policy contains an ambiguity (and neither party has in the present 
case), then the Court must apply the plain meaning of the words used. See Mortensen, 235 P.3d 
at 392? For this reason alone, the Court should deny Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
2 Plaintiffs cite to Mortensen for their proposition that Plaintiffs are entitled to immediate payment under the Title 
Policy. Even ignoring the plain language of the Title Policy, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion Mortensen still does not 
support Plaintiffs' position. The insured in Mortensen sued only after Stewart opted to pay the insured the full 
policy limits and terminate representation of the insured. Mortensen, 235 P.3d at 391 
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As a matter of law, Plaintiffs' present lawsuit is premature, and the Court should dismiss the 
lawsuit without prejudice pending the determination in the Claims Litigation. 
3. Stewart has Proceeded as Diligently as Possible with the Claims Litigation. 
Stewart vigorously disputes that the "diligence" standard alleged by Plaintiffs applies at 
this stage of the Plaintiffs' insurance claim. As set forth above, this entire lawsuit is prohibited 
under the terms of the Title Policy until after the completion of the Claims Litigation and after all 
appeals in that litigation are final. 
Even if this lawsuit and the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment were proper, 
Stewart has proceeded as diligently as possible in the Claims Litigation. Stewart quickly 
retained counsel after Plaintiffs' former attorney sent his self-styled "Notice of Claim" letter to 
Stewart even though the letter did not request action by Stewart. Affidavit ofDarrin Hebdon 
Exhibit B; Affidavit of John Holt<J[IJ[ 9-10. Chuck Homer dealt with two bankruptcies filed by 
Mr. Jarvis, the borrower to which Plaintiffs chose to lend. Affidavit of John Holt <j[<J[ 6-20. Mr. 
Homer worked diligently (and successfully) to obtain a release of the High willow Property from 
the bankruptcy stay. !d. The underlying Claims Litigation was filed less than ten months ago. 
Affidavit of John Holt <J[<J[ 23-25. In short, Stewart and the counsel retained by Stewart to 
represent the Plaintiffs have dealt with the four different legal actions in an expeditious and 
diligent manner. 
Plaintiffs advocate putting the cart before the horse. The present case involves the 
interpretation and application of the Title Policy. The Claims Litigation exists as the proper 
forum to determine whether the insured deed of trust is valid, enforceable, and superior to other 
lien claims on the Highwillow Property. The present case is not the appropriate forum to reargue 
the substantive arguments the parties are thoroughly briefing, litigating, and appealing in the 
Claims Litigation. The Claims Litigation process will determine whether the deed of trust is 
valid, enforceable, and superior. If upon a final determination and after all appeals, the deed of 
trust is determined to be defective as per the insurance provided by the Title Policy then the 
issues raised in the present lawsuit may be ripe. Until then, this lawsuit would become merely a 
duplication of the arguments occurring in the Claims Litigation. 
Stewart considers the Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Summary Judgment in the 
Claims Litigation to be in error and the decision is being appealed. The Title Policy expressly 
provides Stewart that right. Plaintiffs incorrectly claim the Claims Litigation is futile because 
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the "only way to clear title is for Mrs. Jarvis to consent to the Snake River Deed of Trust ... " 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment p. 9. Chuck Homer has already 
obtained an Order of Default and a Default Judgment against Mrs. Jarvis on behalf of Plaintiff 
DAFCO LLC. Affidavit of Richard H. Andrus Exhibits H and I. Under the Default Judgment, 
the insured deed of trust was ordered, adjudged, and decreed to be "paramount in time and 
superior to any estate, right, title or claim of Cross-defendant, Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis." !d. 
Exhibit I p. 3 (emphasis added). Additionally, the appeal from the memorandum decision 
involves the validity, enforceability, and priority of the insured deed of trust as to all other 
claimants. At any rate, the Claims Litigation (including appeals) remains the proper place to 
determine whether the deed of trust is valid, enforceable, and superior. 
4. Plaintiffs are Not Entitled to an Award of Costs, Fees, and Interest, but Stewart is 
Entitled to an Award of Costs and Fees Against Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) 
because they are not the prevailing party on this motion for summary judgment. Because 
Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, their allegations regarding the effective date of their notice 
of claim and their calculations of any interest on the claim do not apply. Moreover, because 
Plaintiffs claim is not yet ripe, the provisions of Idaho Code Section 28-22-104(1) do not apply. 
See Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(1) (applying only to money "due"). Finally, under Section 10(a) of 
the "Conditions" portion of the Title Policy, all payments on accrued interest reduce the amount 
of insurance payable to an insured. See Affidavit of Darrin Hebdon Exhibit A Title Policy 
Conditions § 10( a). Thus, even if Plaintiffs were the prevailing party, the amount of insurance 
available under the Title Policy caps Stewart's total liability. 
Stewart is entitled to costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3) 
and 12-121 because it is the prevailing party on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
Stewart is also the prevailing party because the Court should dismiss the present lawsuit brought 
by Plaintiffs as a matter of law due to unripeness. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the relevant language of the Title Policy is clear and 
unambiguous. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum p. 7. The Title Policy clearly permits Stewart the 
discretion to pursue litigation and appeals to their finality, and no liability for loss or damage 
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attaches until after litigation and appeals have been completed. As a matter of law, the Court 
should deny Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and dismiss the present lawsuit without 
prejudice until after the completion of the Claims Litigation, including all appeals. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 2010. 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP 
By: ~\.~ .. .-41-=:=-~, 
Richard H. Andrus 
Attorneys for Defendant Stewart Title 
Guaranty Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served upon the following individuals in the 
manner indicated below: 
David A. Johnson, Esq. 
Wright, Johnson, Tolson & Wayment, PLLC 
4 77 Shoup A venue, Suite 109 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
P.O. Box 52251 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Facsimile: 208/523-4400 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery by Courier 
[X] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
Richard H. Andrus 
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Michael T. Spink, ISB No. 2201 
Richard H. Andrus, ISB No. 7171 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 639 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: 208/388-1000 
Facsimile: 208/388-1001 
#21111.52 
Attorneys for Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, INC., and 
DAFCOLLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEWART TITLE GUARANTY 
COMPANY and Does 1-10, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-10-280 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD H. ANDRUS 
) IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I, Richard H. Andrus, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and, upon personal 
knowledge, state as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty 
Company ("Stewart") in the underlying action. 
2. I am an individual over the age of eighteen, and a resident of the State of Idaho. 
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3. Stewart requests that the Court take judicial notice of the foregoing documents 
because they are of public record and filed in Bonneville County Case Number CV-2010-651 
(the "Claims Litigation"): 
4. Attached as Exhibit A is the Answer, Counter-claim, Cross-claim, and Third-
party Complaintfor Judicial Foreclosure of Deed of Trust. 
5. Attached as Exhibit B is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
6. Attached as Exhibit Cis the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
7. Attached as Exhibit Dis DAFCO LLC's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8. Attached as Exhibit E is the Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motionfor 
Summary Judgment and in Support of DAFCO 's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
9. Attached as Exhibit F is the Memorandum in Opposition of DAFCO LLC's Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
10. Attached as Exhibit G is the Reply Brief in Support of DAFCO's Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
11. Attached as Exhibit His the Order of Default (Rebecca Chiappini-Jarvis). 
12. Attached as Exhibit I is the Default Judgment (Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis). 
Further this Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 2010. 
Richard H. Andrus 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 1st day of December, 2010. 
(SEAL) 
6-11-15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD H. ANDRUS IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served upon the following individuals in the manner 
indicated below: 
David A. Johnson, Esq. 
Wright, Johnson, Tolson & Wayment, PLLC 
477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 109 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
P.O. Box 52251 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Facsimile: 208/523-4400 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery by Courier 
174 Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
Richard H. Andrus 
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EXHIBIT A 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD H. ANDRUS IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-
Exhibit A 12 
Charles A. Homer, ISB # 1630 
Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.D.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
;p.o. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone 208-523-0620 
Facsimile 208-523-9518 
DISTRiCT COURT 
lHAGISiR!, TE DiVISION 
,,BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
ID/'•HO 
Attorneys for DAFCO, LLC and Snake River Funding, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STA~ OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI-JARVIS, husband and wife, 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited 
Ilability company; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
UNITED SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a 
BOB'S INSULATION, a Utah corporation, 
NEILS & JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE 
'STORE, INC., a!k/a NEILS & JOE'S O.K. 
TIRE, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No.CV-2010-651 
ANSWER , COUNTER-CLAIM, CROSS-
CLAIM, AND TmRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
FOR JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF DEED OF 
TRUST 
Filing Fees: 
Category 1.1 
Category K.3 
Category K.4 
$58.00 
$14.00 
$14.00 
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DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
v. 
Counter-claimant/cross-
claimant/third-party plaintiff 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC an 
Idaho limited liability company; 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA MICHAEL 
JARVIS; REBECCA JARVIS aka BECKY 
JARVIS aka REBECCA CHIAPPINI aka 
BECKY CHIAPPINI; STATE OF IDAHO; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
UNITED SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a 
BOB'S INSULATION; NEILS & JOE'S 
LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., a/k/a 
NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation 
Cross-defendants 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOMMERS d/b/a S & H Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RU:f?Y d/b/a Affordable 
Tile & Flooring; WADE ALLEN 
THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN CENTRAL 
VACUUM SYSTEMS; BURNS 
CONCRETE, INC.; an Idaho corporation; 
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
Thlrd-Party Defendants. 
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COME NOW defendants, DAFCO LLC and Snake River Funding, Inc., ("Answering 
Defendants") and answer plaintiff's Complaint for Foreclosure ("Complaint") as follows: 
First Defense 
1. Answering Defendants deny generally and specifically eaeh and every allegation in the 
Complaint not herein specifically admitted. 
2. Answering Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants 
admit the allegations thereof. 
3. Answering Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants are without sufficient 
information to form a belief concerning the allegations thereof and, therefore deny such 
allegations. 
4. Answering Paragraph 9 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants ~t the allegations 
thereof 
5. Answering Paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants admit that Jarvis was a 
married man when he took title to the property and deny that it is subject to the 
community interest of Chiappini. 
6. Answering Paragraph 11 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants admit the allegations 
thereof with respect to the execution by Jarvis of the promissory note and deed of trust 
described therein and deny that Chiappini' s written consent thereto was required. 
7. Answering Paragraph 12 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants admit the allegations 
thereof. 
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8. Answering Paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants admit that the deed of 
trust described therein was recorded, but are without sufficient information to form a 
belief concerning the remaining allegations thereof and, therefore deny such allegations. 
9. Answering Paragraph 14 ofthe Complaint, Answeriilg Defendants admit that the deed of 
trust described therein was recorded, but are without sufficient information to form a 
belief concerning the remaining allegations thereof and, therefore deny such allegations. 
Answering Defendants affirmatively allege that the deed of trust described in Paragraph 
14 also described defendant DAFCO as a beneficiary thereof, and further, on information 
and belief, that no funds were advanced pursuant to the promissory note described in 
Paragraph 14. 
10. Answering Paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants admit that the deed of 
trust described therein was recorded, but are without sufficient information to form a 
belief concerning the remaining allegations thereof and, therefore deny such allegations. 
11. Answering Paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 ofthe Complaint, Answering Defendants admit the 
allegations thereof. 
12. Answering Paragraph 19 of the Complaint, Answering defendants admit that the abstract 
of judgment described therein was recorded, but on information and belief, deny that 
there is an entity known as Neils & Joe's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc., validly existing on 
the records of the Idaho Secretary of State and are without sufficient information to form . 
a belief concerning the remaining allegations thereof and, therefore deny such allegations. 
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13. Answering Paragraph 20 and 21 ofthe Complaint, Answering Defendants are without 
sufficient information to form a belief concerning the allegations thereof and, therefore 
deny such allegations. 
14. Answering Paragraph 22 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants restate and incorporate 
by reference their previous responses to such allegations as therein incorporated by 
reference. 
15. Answering Paragraph 23 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants deny the allegations 
thereof. 
16. Answering Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants are without 
sufficient information to form a belief concerning the allegations thereof and, therefore 
deny such allegations. 
17. Answering Paragraph 26 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants believe that this 
paragraph contains no allegations to which a response is required, but to the extent that 
any response is required, Answering Defendants deny the allegations thereof. 
18. Answering Paragraph 27 ofthe Complaint, Answering Defendants are without sufficient 
information to form a belief concerning the allegations thereof and, therefore deny such 
allegations. 
19. Answering Paragraph 28 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants restate and incorporate 
by reference their previous responses to such allegations as are therein incorporated by 
reference. 
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20. Answering Paragraphs 29, 30, and 31 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants are 
without sufficient information to form a belief concerning the allegations thereof and) 
therefore deny such allegations. 
21. Answering Paragraph 32 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants restate and incorporate 
by reference their previous responses to such allegations as are therein incorporated by 
reference. 
22. _Answering Paragraph 33 and 34 of the Complaint, Answering Defendants are without 
sufficient information to form a belief concerning the allegations thereof and, therefore 
deny such allegations. 
Claim for Attorney's Fees 
23. Answering Defendants have been required to retain the services of an attorney to defend 
them in this action. 
24. Answering Defendants have incurred and will continue to incur attorney's fees and costs 
in the defense of this action. 
25. Answering Defendants may be entitled to recover from plaintiff and Jarvis their 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action pursuant to 
Idaho Code§§ 12-120, and Idaho Code§ 12-121 as modified by Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54( e), and other relevant provisions of Idaho law. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. In the alternative, ifthe subject real property is community property, 
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a. Becky, through her community interest, appreciated the community benefit 
conferred by DAFCO. It is inequitable for Becky to accept the benefit conferred 
upon the community by DAFCO without providing collateral ~or the value ofthat 
benefit. 
b. Jarvis was acting as an actual or implied agent of Chiappini when he executed the 
deed of trust in favor of Snake River Funding, Inc. 
2. Answering Defendant reserve the right to amend to add affirmative defenses that may 
become known through investigation, research, and discovery. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Answering Defendant prays the judgment, order and decree of this court 
as follows: 
A With respect to the first claim for relief of plaintiff's Complaint 
Page -7 
1. for judgment determining the amount due Plaintiff pursuant to the 
promissory note and other loan documents; 
2. for judgment determining the priority ofDAFCO's deed oftrust to be 
superior, prior and paramount to Plaintiff's liens; 
3. that the Court determine the reasonable value of the property; 
4. for judgment pr~serving to defendants, as their rights may appear, the 
statutory right of redemption provided in Idaho Code§ 11-401 et seq; 
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B. With respect to the second claim for relief of plaintiff's Complaint for judgment 
determining the validity of plaintiff's claims thereunder; 
C. For judgrrient determining the entitlement of any ofthe parties herein to an award 
of costs and fees herein as a prevailing party, if any; 
D. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS-CLAIM, and THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
(JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF DEED OF TRUST) 
(Count 1 -Foreclosure) 
PARrtES 
1. Counterclaimant/cross-claimant/third-party plaintiffDAFCO LLC. ("DAFCO" or 
"Plaintiff') is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of business in 
Bingham County, Idaho. 
2. Cross-defendant Josh M. Jarvis, aka Joshua Michael Jarvis ("Jarvis") is an individual 
residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
3. Cross-defendant Rebecca Jarvis, aka Becky Jarvis, aka Rebecca Chiappini, aka Becky 
Chiappini ("Chiappini"), is an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
4. Cross-defendants Jarvis and Chiappini are husband and wife, having been married on or 
about June 30, 2006. 
5. Cross-defendants Jarvis and Chiappini were married on the date that Defendant Jarvis 
took title to the Property (hereinafter described) by Warranty Deed recorded March 7, 
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2008, as Instnnnent No. 1292539, Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho, as "a 
married man dealing with his sole and separate property," a true and correct copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A (hereafter the "Warranty Deed"). 
6. Third-party DefendantAmeriTitle, Inc. ("AmeriTitle") is an Oregon corporation doing 
business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
7. Cross-defendant New Phase Investments, LLC (''New Phase") is an Idaho ·limited liability 
company with its principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
8. Third-party Defendant First American Title Company, Inc. ("First American") is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal place of business in Bingham County, Idaho. 
9. Third-party Defendant John Sommers, d/b/a S & H Plumbing ("S & H"), is an individual 
residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
10. Third-party Defendant H-K Contractors, Inc.~ ("H-K") is an Idaho corporation with its 
principal place of business located in Bonneville County, Idaho .. 
11. Third-party Defendant Russ Rudy d/b/a Affordable Tile & Flooring ("Affordable Tile") is 
an individual re~iding in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
12. Third-party Defendant Wade Allen Thueson, d/b/a Mountain Central Vacuum Systems 
("MCVS"), is an individual residing in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
13. Cross-defendant State ofidaho, acting by and through the Idaho Department of 
Commerce and Labor is an agency of the State ofidaho ("Idaho"). 
14. Third-party Defendant Burns Concrete, Inc. ("Burns") is an Idaho corporation with its 
principal place ofbusiness in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
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15. Cross-defendant United States of America acting by and through the Internal Revenue 
Service which is an agency of the United States of America ("IRS"). 
16. Third-party Defendant United Subcontractors, Inc. d/b/a Bob's Insulation ("Bob's 
Insulation") is a Utah corporation authorized to do business in Idaho, with its principal 
place of business located in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
17. Cross-defendant Neils & Joe's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc., is believed to be the business 
name used by Neils & Joe's O.K. Tire, Inc., an Idaho corporation with its principal place 
of business in Fremont County, Idaho (''Neils & Joe's"). 
18. Third-party Defendant Medical Recovery Services, LLC, is an Idaho limited liability 
company with its principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho ("Medical 
Recovery Services"). 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
19. Jurisdiction for this action is appropriate in the District Court of the Seventh District of 
the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, pursuant to Idaho Code §5-514 
and 28 U.S.C. 2410. Venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-401, due to the fact that 
the property at issue is located in Bonneville County. 
FACTS 
20. The following described real property, together with the improvements located thereon, in 
the County of Bonneville, State ofldaho (the "Property") is the subject of this foreclosure 
action: 
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Lot 25, Block 18, Comore Lorna, Division No. 23, to the Cotmty of 
Bonneville, State ofldaho, according to the recorded plat thereof. 
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21. Cross-defendant Jarvis is the owner or reputed owner of the Property by virtue of the 
Warranty Deed. 
22. On March 13, 2008, Jarvis executed a Promissory Note (the "DAFCO Note") in favor of 
Snake River Funding, I.nc., in the amount of$268,000.00 and bearing interest at a rate of 
14%. A true and correct copy the Note is attached hereto as Exhibit Band incorporated 
herein by reference. 
23. In order to secure payment of the sums due under the DAFCO Note, including interest, 
costs and attorneys' fees, on or about March 13, 2008 Jarvis, executed and delivered to 
Snake River Funding, Inc., that certain Deed of Trust (the "DAFCO Deed of Trust"), a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C and by this reference made a part hereof. 
The DAFCO Deed of Trust was recorded on March 18, 2008 as Instrument No. 1293728, 
Official Records ofBonneville County, Idaho. The DAFCO Deed of Trust conveyed to 
AmeriTitle, as trustee for the benefit of Snake River Funding, Inc., all of the right, title 
and interest of Jarvis in and to the Real Property described in the DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
24. On April 17, 2008, Snake River Funding, Inc., executed an Assignment of Note and Deed 
ofTrust in favor ofDAFCO, which was recorded on May 1, 2008, as Instrument No. 
1298290, Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho (the "Assignment"), a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and incorporated herein by reference. 
25. Cross-defendant Chiappini claims or may claim an interest in the Property by virtue of 
her marriage to Jarvis. 
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26. Third-party Defendant AmeriTitle is the Trustee for the DAFCO Deed of Trust executed 
by Jarvis in favor of DAFCO, and is named as, and only as, trustee of such Deed of Trust. 
27. Counter-defendant New Phase is the beneficiary of a deed of trust executed by Jarvis on 
April3, 2008 in the amount of$42,000.00, and recorded on April 7, 2008 as Instrument 
1295743, Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho, (hereafter "April Deed of 
Trust"). 
28. No trustee is named in the April Deed of Trust. 
29. Cross-defendant New Phase is also the beneficiary of a deed of trust executed by Jarvis 
and Chiappini on October 28, 2008, in the amount of$42,000.00, and recorded on 
October 28, 2008, as Instrument No. 131544 7, Official Records of Bonneville County, 
Idaho, (hereafter "October Deed of Trust"). 
30. DAFCO and .crpss-defendant New Phase are beneficiaries of a deed of trust executed by 
Jarvis and Chiappini on October 28,2008, in the amount of$63,600.00, and recorded on 
October 28, 2008, as Instrument No. 1315448, Official Records of Bonneville County, 
Idaho, (hereafter "Unfunded Deed of Trust"). 
31. On information and belief, neither DAFCO nor cross-defendant New Phase provided any 
funds to Jarvis on a Promissory Note in the face amount of$63,600.00 dated October 28, 
2008, or any other promissory note secured by the Unfunded Deed of Trust. 
32. The Unfunded Deed of Trust is void and of no effect. 
33. Third-party DefendantS & H Plumbing recorded a Laborer's and Materialman's Notice 
and Claim of Lien asserting a lien against the Property in the qriginal amount of 
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$9,700.51, on October 31,2008, as Instrument No. 1315695, Official Records of 
Bonneville County, Idaho. 
34. Cross-dyfendant New Phase is the beneficiary of a deed of trust executed by Jarvis and 
Chiappini on November 3, 2008, in the amount of $140,000.00, and recorded on 
November 3, 2008, as Instrument No. 1315849, Official Records ofBonneville County, 
Idaho, (hereafter ''November Deed of Trust"). 
35. Third-party Defendant First American is the Trustee for the October Deed of trust, the 
Unfunded Deed of Trust, and the November Deed of Trust described above, and is named 
as, and only as, trustee of such Deeds of Trust. 
36. Third-party Defendant H-K recorded a Notice of Lien asserting a lien against the Property 
in the original amount of$12,299.00, on January 12,2009, as Instrument No. 1320688, 
Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
37. Third-party Defendant Affordable Tile recorded a Claim of Lien for Labor and Material 
asserting a lien against the Property in the original amount of$2,302.00, on January 28, 
I 
2009, as Instrument No. 1322126, Official Records of Bonneville County. 
38. Third-party Defendant MCVS recorded a Claim of Lien asserting a lien against the 
Property in the original amount of$2,680.00 on February 9, 2009 as Instrument No. 
1323160, Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
39. Third-party Defendant Bums recorded a Notice of Claim of Lien asserting a lien against 
the Property in the face amount of $325.52 on February 18, 2009, as Instrument No. 
1324003, Official Records ofBonneville County, Idaho. 
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40. Cross-defendant Idaho filed a Notice ofldaho State Lien in the original amount of 
$2,742.00 on February 19, 2009, as Instrument No. T 404148, Official Records ofidaho 
Secretary of State 
41. Cross-defendant IRS recorded a Notice of Federal Tax Lien asserting a lien against 
property of Jarvis in the amount of $8,412.17 on February 23, 2009, as Instrument No. 
1324371, Official Records ofBonneville County, Idaho. 
42. Cross-defendant Bob's Insulation recorded a Claim of Lien asserting a lien against the 
Property in the face amount of$5,876.40 on February 25,2009, as I~strument No. 
1324738, Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
43. Cross-defendant Neils & Joe's recorded an Abstract of Judgment against cross-
defendants Jarvis and Chiappini in the face amount of$617.30 on July 20,2009, as 
Instrument No. 1339166, Official Records ofBonneville County, Idaho. 
44. Third-Party Defendant Medical Recovery Services recorded an Abstract of Judgment 
against cross-defendants Chiappini and Jarvis in the face amount of$993.36 on 
December 22, 2009, as Instrument No. 1352328, Official Records of Bonneville County, 
Idaho. 
DEFAULT 
45. Jarvis has defaulted in the payment of the amounts required to be paid pursuant to the 
terms of the DAFCO Note in that, among other things, he has failed to pay the balance 
due at maturity on March 18, 2009. 
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46. As a result of such default, DAFCO elected or hereby elects, to the extent not already 
due, to accelerate the entire unpaid balance of principal and interest on the DAFCO Note. 
47. There is now due and owing on the loan evidenced by the DAFCO Note as of December 
21, 2009 the principal amount of$222,215.00, plus $40,580.82 in accrued and unpaid 
interest 
48. Said principal amount continues to accrue interest at a rate of 14% in the amount of 
$85.23 per day from and after December 21, 2009, until the date of judgment. 
49. DAFCO has been required to employ counsel to institute and prosecute this action and 
has obligated itselfto pay a reasonable fee for such services. DAFCO has employed the 
law firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. for such purpose and has paid the 
firm, and continues to pay the fum, for its reasonable attorney fees and costs in 
connection with such services, which attorney fees and costs are secured by the DAFCO 
Note and DAFCO Deed of Trust. DAFCO is entitled to recover from Jarvis its 
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred herein. DAFCO alleges that $25,000.00 is a 
reasonable sum to be allowed as attorney fees herein if this action is uncontested, plus 
such additional sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable attorney fees in the event of 
contest, trial or appeal. 
50. DAFCO has also been required to secure a litigation guarantee from a licensed title 
insurance company in order to prepare this Complaint and other pleadings in connection 
with this action. The cost of such litigation guarantee, which at this time equals 
$1,109.00, may increase on account ofthe amount of the indebtedness including 
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foreclosure costs to be covered by such litigation guarantee. The costs associated with 
such litigation guaranty should be paid to DAFCO by Jarvis and is secured by the 
DAFCO Deed of Trust referred to herein:. 
51. DAFCO has a first lien in and to the Property and is entitled to judgment, decree of 
foreclosure and prder of sale pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-101. DAFCO is further entitled 
to such other orders or writs as shall be appropriate to enable DAFCO to attempt to 
recover at sheriff's foreclosure sale the loan, principal and interest and late charges, 
together with costs and expenses previously referred to and other costs incurred or to be 
incurred in connection with this action. 
52. The defendants, and each of them, claim or may claim an interest in the Property 
described in the above-described loan documents. The interests of the defendants, and 
each of them, in the Property are inferior and subordinate to the lien ofDAFCO described 
herein. 
53. DAFCO is entitled to foreclose the DAFCO Deed of Trust under the laws of the State of 
Idaho pertaining to mortgages and deeds of trust, free and clear of the claims of 
defendants, and each of them. 
54. DAFCO is entitled to entry of a deficiency judgment against the cross-defendant Jarvis in 
the amount of the difference between the total due on the DAFCO Note and Deed of 
Trust and the net proceeds of the sheriffs sale and foreclosure; or, the difference between 
the total due on the DAFCO Note and Deed of Trust and the reasonable value of the 
Property at the time of sale, whichever is the lesser sum. 
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55. DAFCO realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 54 as though fully 
set forth herein. 
56. In the alternative, the Property subject to the DAFCO Deed of Trust was community 
property at the time Jarvis executed the DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
57. DAFCO or its predecessor extended funds to Jarvis based upon representations made by 
Jarvis and under reasonable belief that the Property subject to the DAFCO Deed of Trust 
securing the Note was encumbered in its entirety by Jarvis's execution of the DAFCO 
Deed of Trust. 
58. DAFCO or its predecessor conferred a benefit upon the community by extending funds to 
Jarvis based upon his representations. 
59. Chiappini, through her community interest, appreciated the benefit conferred by DAFCO. 
60. It is inequitable for Chiappini to accept the benefit conferred upon the community by 
DAFCO without providing collateral for the value of that benefit. 
61. DAFCO is entitled to an order and decree that Chiappini's community property interest in 
the Property is encumbered by the DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
(Count 3) 
62. DAFCO realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 54 as though fully 
set forth herein. 
63. In the alternative, the Property subject to the DAFCO Deed of Trust was community 
property at the time Jarvis executed the DAFCODeed of Trust. 
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64. At the time Jarvis executed the DAFCO Deed of Trust, Jarvis was acting as an actual or 
implied agent of Chiappini 
65. At the time Jarvis executed the DAFCO Deed of Trust, he encumbered both his 
community property interest in the Property and the community property interest of 
Chiappini through his role as actual or implied agent of ChiappinL 
66. DAFCO is entitled to an order and decree that Chiappini's community property interest in 
the Property is encumbered by the DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, DAFCO prays the judgment, order and decree ofthis Court as follows: 
A. That it be ordered, adjudged and decreed that the DAFCO Deed of Trust is 
paramount in time and superior in right to any estate, right, title or claim of 
defendants, or any of them. 
B. That DAFCO have judgment against Jarvis for the following amounts: 
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1. For the principal amount of$222,215.00 plus interest accruing on the 
principal at the rate 14% in the amount of $85.23 per day from and after 
December 21, 2009, until the date of judgment 
2. For the sum of$25,000.00 as and for DAFCO's attorneys' fees if 
judgment is entered by default and for such further sums as the Court 
deems just and reasonable if this matter is contested. 
3. For the $1,109.00 title company charges incurred, and those to be incurred 
in the future in connection with this proceeding. 
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4. For such other costs and disbursements as may be authorized by law or 
court rule, including any advances by DAFCO for the preservation, 
protection, maintenance or operation of the Property, post-judgment 
foreclosure costs, and interest on any of the foregoing mentioned sums. 
C. That it be adjudged and decreed that the DAFCO Deed of Trust be foreclosed and 
that a usual decree be made for the sale of the Property by the sheriff of 
Bonneville County, Idaho, according to the law and practice of this Court; that the 
proceeds of the sale may be applied in payment of the amounts due to DAFCO; 
·and that defendants, and all persons claiming under them, subsequent to the 
execution and recording of the Deed of Trust upon the Property, either as 
purchasers, encumbrances, or otherwise, be barred and foreclosed from all right, 
claim or equity of redemption in and to the Property and every. part thereof, 
subject however to the statutory right of redemption of Idaho Code §45-113. 
D. That DAFCO or any party to this proceeding may become a purchaser at such 
sale; that DAFCO be allowed to make a credit bid at such sale in any amount not 
exceeding the total judgment; that the sheriff execute a deed and certificate of sale 
to the purchaser; that the purchaser be let into possession of the Property on 
production of the certificate of sale thereof. 
E. That it be ordered, adjudged and decreed that to the extent that Chiappini has a 
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community property interest in the Property, that it is encumbered by the DAFCO 
Deed of Trust. 
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F. That this Court retainjmisdiction following such sale for the purpose hereafter of 
establishing the reasonable value of the Property, if requested by DAFCO, and to 
award DAFCO judgment and execution against the defendant Jarvis, for any 
deficiency which may remain after applying the greater of (1) all of the proceeds 
received from the sale of the Property, or (2) the reasonable value of the Property, 
to the satisfaction of such foreclosure judgment. 
G. That DAFCO have such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and 
proper. 
DATED this -::J1t1 day ofFebruary, 2010. 
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Charles A. Homer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Cra , P.L.L.C., 
attorneys for DAFCO LLC and Snake River 
Funding, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·I hereby certify that I am a duly icensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the day ofFebruary, 2010, I served a true and correct 
. copy of the foregoing document on the ersons listed below by first class mail, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same· to be delivered as defined by Rule 5(b ), I.R. C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Michael D. Gaffuey 
Jared W. Allen 
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Fax No. 208-529-9732 
~Mail[] 
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EXHIBITB 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD H. ANDRUS IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-
Exhibit B 
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Michael D. Gaffney; ISB No. 3558 
Jared W. Allen, ISB No. 5793 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorney for·Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No.: CV-2010-651 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
CHIAPPINI-JARVIS, husband and wife, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SNAKE RIVER ·FUNDING, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, DAFCO LLC., an Idaho 
limited liability company, IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND 
LABOR, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, uNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S · 
INSULATION, a Utah corporation, NEILS 
& JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, 
INC. AfKJ A NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company,. 
Counter-claimant/cross-
claimant/third-party plaintiff, 
vs. 
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NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA 
MICHAEL JARVIS; REBECCA JARVIS 
aka BECKY JARVIS aka REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI aka BECKY CHIAPPINI; 
STATE OF IDAHO; UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA; UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATION; NEILS & JOE'S LES 
SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC. a/k/a 
NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Cross-defendants 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
. corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOMMERS d/b/a S & H Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RUDY d/b/a 
Affordable Tile & Flooring; WADE 
ALLEN THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN 
CENTRAL VACUUM SYSTEMS; 
BURNS CONTRETE, INC.; an Idaho 
corporation; MEDICAL RECOVERY 
SERVICES, LLC an Idaho limited liability 
company; 
Third-Pa Defendants. 
New Phase Investments LLC (New Phase), by and through its attorneys of record, 
respectfully moves this Court for summary judgment as a full and final resolution in the 
above entitled action. This motion is supported by the Affidavit of Jared W. Allen and the 
Memorandum in Support ofPlainti:ff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
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Oral argument is requested. 
J e . Allen 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Idaho 
Falls, Idaho, and ori April6, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the following by the method of delivery 
designated: 
Charles Homer 
Karl Decker 
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo 
P0Box50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Fax: (208) 523~9518 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 529-1300 
e .A en 
eard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
lidJ U.S. Mail ~and-delivered ltd! Facsimile 
liJ U.S. Mail~and-delivered D Facsimile 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
Jared W. Allen, ISB No. 5793 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI-JARVIS, husband and wife, 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, DAFCO LLC., an Idaho 
limited liability company, IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND 
LABOR, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATION, a Utah corporation, NEILS 
& JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, 
INC. A/K/A NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
vs. 
Cotmter-claimant/cross-
claimant/third-party plaintiff, 
Case No.: CV-2010-651 
MEMORANDUM INSUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment --
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NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA 
MICHAEL JARVIS; REBECCA JARVIS 
aka BECKY JARVIS aka REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI aka BECKY CHIAPPINI; 
STATE OF IDAHO; UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA; UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATION; NEILS & JOE'S LES 
SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC. alkfa . 
NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Cross-defendants 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOMMERS d/b/a S & H Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RUDY d/b/a 
Affordable Tile & Flooring; WADE 
ALLEN THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN 
CENTRAL VACUUM SYSTEMS; 
BURNS CONTRETE, INC.; an Idaho 
corporation; MEDICAL RECOVERY 
SERVICES, LLC an Idaho limited liability 
company; 
Third-P Defendants. 
New Phase Investments LLC (New Phase), through its attorneys of record, 
respectfully submits the following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New Phase seeks summary judgment in this matter as a full and final resolution of 
the claims of all named parties. The State of Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor 
and the United States Internal Revenue Service have both disclaimed their interests. The 
remaining parties claiming an interest under Claims of Liens or Abstracts of Judgments 
are in default, have allowed their liens claims to expire, and/or are indisputably inferior in 
terms of priority to the security interests of New Phase. Only Snake River Funding, Inc. 
and DAFCO LLC. (collectively Snake River/DAFCO) have appeared to defend and 
challenge the claims of New Phase. The interest claimed by Snake River/DAFCO is void 
as a matter of law. New Phase has the superior priority, Josh and Rebecca Jarvis (the 
Jarvises) are in default, and New Phase is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and 
foreclosure of its liens. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
New Phase respectfully submits the following factual narrative as undisputed and 
supportive of this motion: 
1. Josh Jarvis and Rebecca Jarvis, aka Rebecca Chiappini or Becky Chiappini 
(referred to individually herein as "Josh Jarvis" and "Rebecca Jarvis" and collectively as 
"the Jarvises") married on June 30, 2006 and have remained married from that time to the 
present. Rule 2004 Examination ofBecky Chiappini (R. Jarvis Depo), p. 35, 1. 20- p. 36, 
l. 4. 
2. Josh Jarvis did not own any property at the time he married Rebecca Jarvis. R. 
Jarvis Depo, p. 37, II. 11-13. 
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3. Josh Jarvis acquired certain real property at issue in this case more specifically 
. described as "Lot 25, Block 18, COMORE LOMA, DIVISION NO. 23, to the County of 
Bonneville, State of Idaho, according to the recorded plat thereof' (the Highwillow 
property) on March 7, 2008 by warranty deed specifically identifYing him as a married 
man. R. Jarvis Depo, p. 37, 11. 6-23; Bonneville County Instrument No. 1292539. 
4. On March 11,2008, Josh Jarvis executed articles of incorporation to create J's 
Construction, Inc., an Idaho corporation that has since been administratively dissolved, 
and on March 13,2008, the corporation was recognized by the Secretary of State. 
Articles of Organization. 
5. On March 13, 2008, Josh Jarvis executed a deed of trust (the Snake 
River/DAFCO deed of trust) for the benefit of Snake River Funding, Inc. (Snake River) 
purporting to give Snake River a security interest in the amount of $268,000 in the 
Highwillow property. Bonneville Count Instrument No. 1293728. The Snake 
River/DAFCO deed of trust was not executed or acknowledged by Rebecca Jarvis. Id. 
6. On March 18, 2008, Snake River assigned its deed of trust to DAFCO LLC. 
Bonneville County Instrument No. 1298290. 
7. On April3, 2008, Josh Jarvis executed another deed of trust for the benefit of 
New Phase purporting to give New Phase a security interest in. the amount of $42,000 in 
the Highwillow property. Bonneville County Instrument No. 1295743. Again, the deed of 
trust was not executed or acknowledged by Rebecca Jarvis. Id. 
8. On October 28, 2008, Josh and Rebecca Jarvis executed a second deed of 
trust for the benefit ofNew Phase giving New Phase a security interest in the amount of 
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deed of trust explicitly superseded the April 3, 2008 deed of trust given to New Phase. 
9. On October 31,2008, John Sommers d/b/a S&H Plumbing (S&H) filed a 
claim oflien against the Highwillow property. Bonneville County Instrument No. 
1315695. More than six months have passed since the filing of the lien and no action has 
been commenced to enforce the lien. 
10. On November 3, 2008, Josh and Rebecca Jarvis executed another deed of trust 
for the benefit of New Phase giving New Phase additional security in the amount of 
$140,000 in the Highwillow property. Bonneville County Instrument No. 1315849. 
11. On January 12, 2009, H-K Contractors, Inc. filed a claim of lien against the 
Highwillow property. Bonneville County Instrument No. 1320688. More than six months 
have passed since the filing of the lien and no action has been commenced to enforce the 
lien. 
12. On January 28, 2009, Russ Rudy d/b/a Affordable Tile & Flooring filed a 
claim of lien against the Highwillow property. Bonneville County Instrument No. 
1322126. More than six months have passed since the filing of the lien and no action has 
been commenced to enforce the lien. 
13. On February 9, 2009, Wade Allen Thueson d/b/a Mountain Central Vacuum 
Systems (MCVS) filed a claim of lien against the Highwillow property. Bonneville 
County lnstrument No. 1323160. More than six months have passed since the filing of 
the lien and no action has been commenced to enforce the lien. 
14. On February 18,2009, Burns Concrete, Inc. (Burns) filed a claim of lien 
against the Highwillow property. Bonneville County Instrument No. 1324003. More than 
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enforce the lien. 
15. On February 19,2009, the Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor caused 
Notice of Idaho State Lien No. T404148 against Josh Jarvis to be filed with the Idaho 
Secretary of State. Idaho State Lien No. T404148. The Idaho Department of Commerce 
and Labor has disclaimed any interest in the Highwillow property. Disclaimer. 
16. On February 23, 2009, the Internal Revenue Service caused a Notice of 
Federal Tax Lien against Josh Jarvis to be recorded in Bonneville County. Bonneville 
County Instrument No. 1324371. The Internal Revenue Service has disclaimed any 
interest in the Highwillow property. Disclaimer of Interest. 
17. On February 25, 2009, United Subcontractors, Inc. d/b/a Bob's Insulation 
(United) filed a claim of lien against the Highwillow property. Bonneville County 
Instrument No. 1324738. More than six months have passed since the filing of the lien 
and no action has been commenced to enforce the lien. 
18. On July 20, 2009, Neils & Joe's Les Schwab Tire Store, Inc. (Neils & Joe's) 
recorded an abstract of judgment evidencing a judgment against the Jarvises in its favor. 
Bonneville County Instrument No. 1339166. 
19. On December 22, 2009, Medical Recovery Services recorded an abstract of 
judgment evidencing a judgment against the Jarvises in its favor. Bonneville County 
InstrumentNo. 1352328. 
20. Jarvises have defaulted on payments due to New Phase and New Phase has 
declared all payments due under the terms of its agreement with Jarvises. Jarvises are 
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indebted to New Phase in the principal sum of$168,730.86 plus interest. Complaint for 
Foreclosure, 11 24-25. 
21. On January 15,2010, Snake River/DAFCO filed a Complaint in this court, by 
separate counsel verified by Jeff Avery as manager of Snake River, against Stewart Title 
Guaranty Company admitting, inter alia, that Jarvis was married at the time he executed 
the Snake River/DAFCO deed of trust, that clearing title would have required a quitclaim 
deed or some other instrument executed by Rebecca Jarvis renouncing any interest in the 
Highwillow property, and that Rebecca Jarvis never signed such a document or otherwise 
consented to the Snake River/DAFCO deed of trust. Complaint, Bonneville County Case 
No. CV-1 0-280, Aff. Allen, Ex. U. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56( c )(2007); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 
514,516-17, 808 P.2d 851, 853-54 (1991). When assessing the motion for summary 
judgment, the court must draw all facts and inferences in favor ofthe non-moving party. 
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991); 
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 
(Ct.App.1994); Haessley v. Safeco Title Insurance Company of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463, 
825 P.2d 1119 (1992). 
At all times, the moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Tingly v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960 (1994). 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment --
Page 7 · 
. 
' 
However, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the pleadings and must come 
forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Indian 
Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, LLC, 147 Idaho 737,747,215 P.3d 457, 
467 (2009); Olsen v. J.A. Freemen Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990), 
citing, Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A mere 
scintilla of evidence will not create an issue of material fact and defeat a claim for 
summary judgment. Jephson v. Ambuel, 93 Idaho 790,793,473 P.2d 932,935 (1970). 
ARGUMENT 
New Phase is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As set forth below, there are 
no facts under which any other party can claim a priority superior to that of New Phase. 
I. The state and federal government agencies have disclaimed their interests. 
The Idaho Department of Labor "disclaim[ed] any right title and interest the 
Department of Labor may have" in the Highwillow property. Disclaimer. The Internal 
Revenue Service similarly "disclaim[ed] any right, title, interest or claim in or to the real 
property described in the Complaint for Foreclosure filed herein on February 3, 2010." 
Disclaimer of Interest. 
When a party disclaims all right, title, interest or claim to property without 
reservation, the title is freed from the lien of that party and is binding on the parties to the 
suit and their privies. Kilpatrick Bros; Co. v. Campbell, 48 Idaho 194, 199, 281 P. 471 
( 1929). In effect, the disclaiming party is thereafter estopped from claiming an interest in 
the property involved in the litigation. !d. 
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By disclaiming their interests, the Department of Labor and the I.R.S. have 
release their claims to the property and have given up any opportunity to challenge the 
lien rights of New Phase. 
II. The claims of all remaining parties have expired or are otherwise 
indisputably inferior to those of New Phase. 
The claims of all parties claiming under a Claim of Lien or Abstract of Judgment 
are inferior in priority, have expired, or have been resolved by default. 
United and Neils & Joe have both failed to appear and defend in this action and 
are in default. 
A. All Materialmen Claims of Liens filed against the property have expired by 
passage of time. 
The following claims of lien have been filed against the Highwillow property: 
Claimant Date Instrument Source 
United 2/25/2009 1324738 Complaint, Exhibit H 
S&H 10/31/2008 1315695 Counterclaim,, 33 
H-K 1112/2009 1320688 Counterclaim,, 36 
Affordable Tile 1/28/2009 1322126 Counterclaim,, 37 
MCVS 2/9/2009 1323160 Counterclaim,, 38 
Burns 2/18/2009 1324003 Counterclaim, § 39 
Idaho Code § 45-510 provides, in pertinent part, "No lien provided for in this 
chapter binds any building, mining claim, improvement or structure for a longer period 
that six (6) months after the claim has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a 
proper court within that time to enforce such lien." More than six months has passed form 
the date each claim of lien was filed against the Highwillow property and no action has 
been commenced to enforce the liens. Accordingly, the liens no longer bind the 
Highwillow property and to the extent any of the lienholders claimed an interest superior 
to that of New Phase that interest has expired. 
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B. Both Abstracts of Judgment appearing in the record are inferior to New Phase's 
priority. 
Neils & Joe recorded an Abstract of Judgment evidencing a judgment against the 
Jarvises on July 20, 2009. Medical Recovery recorded an Abstract of Judgment 
evidencing a judgment against the Jarvises on December 22,2009. Both are inferior to 
New Phase's deeds of trust. 
Idaho Code § 10-1110 provides that an abstract of judgment "may be recorded ... 
and from the time of such recording, and not before, the judgment so recorded become a 
lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county ... owned by him at the 
time or acquired afterwards." 
The earliest Neils & Joe and Medical Recovery secured liens would have been 
July 20, 2009 and December 22, 2009, respectively. This is well after New Phase 
obtained its deeds of trust. Accordingly, New Phase's interest is indisputably superior to 
that of both Neils & Joe and Medical Recovery and summary judgment must be granted. 
III. The claims of Snake River/DAFCO are not supported by the law. 
The only remaining claimants other than New Phase, namely Snake River and 
DAFCO by assignment, do not have a valid interest in the property. The Highwillow 
property is the community property of the Jarvises and Rebecca Jarvis did not sign the 
deed of trust purporting to give Snake River a security interest in the property. As a result, 
Snake River's deed of trust is void as a matter of law. 
A. The Highwillow property is Jarvis community property. 
Josh Jarvis acquired his interest in the Highwillow property during his marriage to 
Rebecca Jarvis and the property is, as a result, community property. The undisputed 
evidence clearly establishes that Josh Jarvis did not have any real property prior to his 
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marriage and all property subsequently acquired is, as a matter of law, community 
property. 
Under Idaho law, property owned prior to the marriage remains separate property. 
I.C. § 32-903. Similarly, all property acquired with proceeds from separate property 
remains separate property. Id. Finally, all property received by gift, bequest, devise or 
descent during the marriage is separate property. Id. "AD other property acquired after 
the marriage by either husband or wife is community property." I.C. § 32-906(1) 
(emphasis added). The Highwillow property was acquired by Josh Jarvis after his 
marriage, was not acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent, and was not acquired with 
the proceeds from separate property. The evidence is conclusive and undisputed. The 
Highwillow property is community property. 
Jarvis and Chiappini married on June 30, 2006 and have remained married from 
that time to the present. Rule 2004 Examination of Becky Chiappini (R. Jarvis Depo), p. 
35, I. 20- p. 36, I. 4. According to Rebecca Jarvis's testimony, Jarvis did not own any 
property at the time of their marriage and he acquired the property at issue sometime in 
2008, approximately two years into the marriage. R. Jarvis Depo, p. 37, ll. 6-23. In 
addition to Rebecca Jarvis's testimony, the public record, Bonneville County Instrument 
No. 1292539, conclusively establishes that Josh Jarvis acquired the property on March, 7, 
2008. 
It is foreseeable that Snake River/DAFCO may seek to argue that the property 
was an asset of Josh Jarvis's business, J's Construction, Inc., an Idaho corporation which 
has since been administratively dissolved. The contention would be that the property was 
that of a business entity, not the community, and is thus separate property. Such an 
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argument is without merit. First, the deed by which the property was acquired clearly 
indicates that it is transferred to Jarvis, not the business. Actually there is no mention of 
the business in the deed whatsoever. Second, the entity, J's Construction, was organized 
in March 13, 2008, a week after the property was acquired and did not exist and thus 
could not have acquired the property. Third and fmally, as the entity was created almost 
two years after the marriage and there is no evidence to suggest that it was organized with 
separate property capital, thus, the entity and its assets are community property. Even if 
the Highwillow property had been acquired by J's Construction, it would still be 
community property. 
The evidence is clear, Jarvises did not and do not have any property that was not 
acquired during their marriage. The Highwillow property is community property as a 
matter of law. 
B. The Snake River Deed of Trust is void and provides notice to no one. 
Because the property belongs to the community, the paramount issue becomes the 
validity of the deed oftrust executed by Jarvis in favor of Snake River and later acquired 
by DAFCO. Josh Jarvis alone executed the deed of trust, purportedly granting a security 
interest in favor of Snake River in his sole and separate property. Because it was not his 
sole and separate property, it was incumbent on Snake River to secure the signature and 
acknowledgement of Rebecca Jarvis as well. Because she did not execute the deed of 
trust, it is void as a matter of law. 
Idaho Code § 32-912 provides, "Either the husband or the wife shall have the 
right to manage and control the community property, and either may bind the community 
property by contract, except that neither the husband nor wife may sell, convey, or 
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encumber the community real estate unless the other joins in executing the sale 
agreement, deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the real estate is sold, 
conveyed or encumbered." (emphasis added) It is settled law in Idaho, and has been for . 
some time, that neither spouse has a right to encumber community real property unless 
the other spouse joins in the execution and acknowledgement of the instrument 
encumbering it. The courts have consistently held that an encumbrance on community 
property executed by one spouse, but not the other, is void. U.S. v. McConkey, 430 F.2d 
652 (9th Cir. 1970); Kays v. Brack, 350 F. Supp 1243 (D. Idaho 1972); Love/ass v. 
Sword, 140 Idaho 105,90 P.3d 330 (2004); Thomas v. Stevens, 69 Idaho 100,203 P.2d 
597 (1949). 
Josh Jarvis's attempt to encumber the Highwillow property without the signature 
of his wife resulted in an encumbrance that is void. The statute and the case law are 
clear. Without Rebecca Jarvis's signature and acknowledgement, Snake River/DAFCO's 
deed of trust is a nullity. 
The holding in U.S. v. McConkey, supra, is instructive. There the U.S. 
government brought an action to foreclose on a mortgage on real property located in 
Elmore County. U.S. v. McConkey, 430 F.2d at 653. Idaho resident, J.D. Caradine 
(Caradine) had executed and delivered a mortgage as security for a loan from the 
government through the Farmers Home Administration. ld Caradine executed the 
mortgage as a single man and also executed an affidavit averring that he was single. Jd. 
The administrator of Caradine's estate answered the foreclosure action claiming the 
mortgage was invalid because Caradine was married at the time of execution and his 
spouse did not join in executing the mortgage. !d. 
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Caradine had married Pearl Moore (Moore) in California almost 30 years before 
executing the mortgage, had left Moore in California and had not resided with her for 12-
13 years before executing the mortgage, but there was no evidence of a divorce. Id. The 
U.S. district court ruled the mortgage invalid and denied foreclosure. ld. On appeal, the 
9th Circuit agreed holding, "An encumbrance is void unless both husband and wife join 
in the execution and their signatures are acknowledged." Id., (citing Fairchildv. 
Wiggins, 85 Idaho 402, 380 P.2d 6 (1963); Reiman v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 134 
(D.Idaho 1961); Knudsen v. Lythman, 33 Idaho 794, 200 P. 130 (1920)). The 9th Circuit 
indicated, "Although, as noted by the district court, the result is rather harsh under the 
circumstances, the statutory and case law ofidaho is clear that the property must be 
considered the community real property of these persons, and neither spouse had a right 
to encumber it without the other joining in the execution and acknowledgement of the 
instrument encumbering it." ld, (citing Idaho Code§ 32-912). 
Snake River/DAFCO will also argue that the result is unfair or excessively harsh. 
As in McConkey, however, the result in the present case, harsh or not, cannot be avoided. 
The only distinguishing facts between the two cases is that Josh Jarvis, unlike Caradine in 
McConkey, did not make any attempt to conceal his marriage. Snake River/DAFCO knew 
that Josh Jarvis was married and still failed to secure Rebecca Jarvis's signature and 
acknowledgement. The Deed of Trust granted to Snake River is void as a matter oflaw. 
There is no evidence and there are no disputed facts under which Snake River/DAFCO 
can establish that Josh Jarvis had the right to encumber the property without Rebecca 
Jarvis joining in the execution and acknowledgement of the deed of trust. "[T]he statutory 
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and case law is clear'' and the deed of trust recorded by Snake River and assigned to 
DAFCO is void as a matter of law. 
As noted in Undisputed Fact No. 21, supra, Snake River/DAFCO are, quite 
frankly, fully aware that their deed of trust is void and have admitted as much under oath 
in bringing their action against Stewart Title. On January 15, 2010, Snake River/DAFCO 
filed a Complaint in this court, by separate counsel, verified by Jeff Avery as manager of 
Snake River, against Stewart Title Guaranty Company. Under oath, Jeff Avery admitted 
that Josh Jarvis was married at the time he executed the Snake River/DAFCO deed of 
trust. He also admitted that clearing title would have required a quitclaim deed or some 
other instrument executed by Rebecca Jarvis renouncing any interest in the Highwillow 
property. Finally, he admitted that Rebecca Jarvis never signed such a document or 
otherwise consented to the Snake River/DAFCO deed of trust. Complaint, Bonneville 
County Case No. CV-1 0-280. 
Undisputed factual assertions made in pleadings have long been held in Idaho and 
many other jurisdictions to constitute ·~udicial admissions" that are "conclusively" 
binding on the party making the admission. White v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 
1396 (51h Cir. 1983). See also, Swanson v. Idaho, 83 Idaho 126 (1960). Such admissions 
constitute "formal proof, and possess the highest probative value because they are 
established beyond the need of evidence to prove them." Hill v. Fed Trade Comm 'n, 124 
F.2d 104, 106,34 F.T.C. 1800 (5th Cir. 1941); Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 
201 F.3d 815, 829 (6th Cir. 2000); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. StLouis Southwestern Co., 125 
F.3d 481, 483 (71h Cir. 1997). A judicial admission is a "formal fact" that "disposes with 
the production of evidence, by conceding for the purposes of litigation that the 
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proposition offact is true." Frances Giamanco v. Paul Giamanco, 111 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 
1022 (1982). The admission is a "waiver relieving the opposing party from the need of 
any evidence, and is conclusive is the sense that it formally waives all right to deny the 
admitted facts" and "removes the proposition in question from the field of disputed 
issues.Jd. 
Judicial admissions are of greater probative value even than trial or deposition 
testimony because they "occur under the direction and supervision of counsel, who has 
full professional realization of their significance" as compared to "easily misunderstood 
answers given by a lay opponent in a deposition." Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc., 128 Cal. 
App. 41h 1519, 1522 (Cal. App. 2005). As a result, ajudicial admission "gives conclusive 
effect to the truth of the matter admitted." Jd. 
Based upon the sworn allegations of Snake River/DAFCO, the judicial 
admissions, in Bonneville County Case No. CV-1 0-280, it is conclusively established that 
the Snake River/DAFCO deed of trust is void as a matter oflaw. It is undisputed that Josh 
Jarvis was married at the time he acquired the Highwillow property. It is further 
undisputed and conclusively admitted that Jarvis was married at the time he executed that 
Snake River/DAFCO deed of trust and that an enforceable deed of trust would have 
required participation by Rebecca Jarvis or a waiver of her interests. Finally, it is 
conclusively admitted that Rebecca Jarvis did not participate or otherwise waive her 
interest. In other words, Snake River/DAFCO have conclusively admitted that their deed 
of trust is void as a matter oflaw. As a result, summary judgment must be granted against 
them on their claim for foreclosure on that deed of trust. 
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C. The Snake River/DAFCO estoppel claim cannot be supported for lack of reliance. 
DAFCO has asserted in its counterclaim/cross-claim that "[i]t is inequitable for 
[Rebecca Jarvis] to accept the benefit conferred upon the community by DAFCO without 
providing collateral for the value of that benefit." Counterclaim,§ 60. It is, in essence, an 
argument for equitable estoppel, but the claim must fail as a matter of law because Snake 
River/DAFCO cannot establish the essential elements of the claim. Snake River/DAFCO 
cannot provide any evidence to show that Rebecca Jarvis made any statements or 
engaged in any conduct amounting to a false representation or concealment of material 
fact. Absent any evidence of false or misleading statements or conduct by Rebecca Jarvis, 
Snake River/DAFCO cannot provide any evidence to show that Rebecca Jarvis intended 
that they act upon any such statements or conduct. Snake River/DAFCO cannot provide 
any evidence to show that Rebecca Jarvis had knowledge that the transaction was even 
occurring. Absent any evidence of false or misleading statements or conduct by Rebecca 
Jarvis, Snake River/DAFCO cannot provide any evidence that they lacked knowledge or 
a means of ascertaining knowledge of the truth of the facts. Snake River/DAFCO cannot 
provide any evidence to show that they actually relied on any conduct or statements from 
Rebecca Jarvis. And finally, Snake River/DAFCO cannot provide any evidence to show 
that they changed their position based upon that reliance. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the rule "that a contract to convey 
community real estate is void if not signed and acknowledged by both the husband and 
the wife ... is not an inexorable rule." Love/ass v. Sword, 140 Idaho at 109, 90 P.3d at 
334. There is one very limited exception. The Supreme Court has expressly held that 
"'conduct from which acquiescence can be inferred may be sufficient to establish an 
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estoppel."' Love/ass, at 109, 334, (citing Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 
301, 305, 658 P.2d 972, 976 (1983)). This theory of recovery is of no effect for Snake 
River/DAFCO because Rebecca Jarvis has not engaged in any such conduct. 
Under Love/ass, Snake River/DAFCO would have to show that Rebecca Jarvis's 
conduct was "consistent with the existence and validity of the instrument." Id. Earlier 
holdings of the Court clearly delineate the elements of the estoppel claim. In order to 
establish equitable estoppel as against Chiappini, DAFCO would be required to show: (1) 
conduct or representations by Chiappini amounting to false representation or concealment 
of material facts calculated to convey the impression that facts are other than she now 
asserts; (2) intention by Chiappini that the conduct be acted upon by SRF; (3) knowledge 
by Chiappini of the real facts; (4) a lack of knowledge and of a means ofknowledge of 
the truth of the facts by SRF; (5) actual reliance by SRF upon the conduct ofCI}iappini; 
and (6) a change of position based upon that reliance. Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 
53,480 P.2d 899 (1971). 
Regarding the execution of document related to the Highwillow property and the 
relationship with Snake River in particular, Rebecca Jarvis made it clear that she had no 
interaction with Snake River/DAFCO whatsoever. She testified: 
Q. (By Mr. Davis) At that time, at the time that it appears your 
husband signed this promissory note and the deed of trust, did 
Dafco (sic)-- excuse me. I apologize. I don't mean Dafco (sic). 
Did Snake River Funding, Inc., or anyone on behalf of Snake 
River Funding, Inc., contact you to see if you were aware of this 
transaction? 
A. (By Mrs. Jarvis) No. 
Q. At that same time did anybody from Snake River Funding, 
Inc., contact you to ask you if you consented to the loan or the 
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execution of the deed of trust or lien on the property on High 
Willow (sic)? 
A.No. 
Q. And at that same time period did Snake River Funding, Inc., 
or anybody on their behalf contact you for any reason as it relates 
to this transaction or any other transaction? 
A.No. 
Q. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Jarvis - - you're probably not 
used to having to talk about him in terms of Mr. Jarvis-- but did 
you ever discuss with Mr. Jarvis in March of2008 anything about 
this transaction that's represented in pages 1, 2, and 3 of Exhibit 
*-003? 
A No . 
. Q. Were you even aware it was happening? 
A.No. 
Q. Did he ever ask you to sign the promissory note or deed of 
trust? 
A No. 
R. Jarvis Depo, p. 43, l. 6-p. 44, l. 16 
She further testified that she did not even know that any loans were being incurred 
and did not know anything about the acquisition of property. She testified: 
Q. {By Mr. Decker) Did you ever have any discussions about 
how he would be doing business? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever discuss how he would take title to real property 
that he was developing when he was building a spec home? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever object to the way he did it? Did you even know 
how he did it? 
A. I didn't know. 
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Q. Did you object to him incurring loans so that he could build 
these homes? 
A. I couldn't object ifi didn't knowR. Jarvis Depo, p. 57, I. 17-p. 
58, I. 4. 
Snake River/DAFCO cannot provide any evidence that Rebecca Jarvis engaged in 
conduct or made statements that amounted to a misrepresentation or concealment of 
facts. Indeed, they cannot even provide evidence that they had any contact with her at all. 
Because they cannot show any conduct or statements, they cannot show any intention on 
her part, any knowledge on her part, any lack of knowledge on its part, any reliance on its 
part, or any change of position based upon that reliance. Snake River/DAFCO cannot 
prove a single element necessary to establish its estoppel claim. As a result, summary 
judgment must be granted. 
Again, the existing case law is instructive. In Love/ass, Gerald Lovelass (Gerald) 
allegedly entered into an oral contract for the sale of a house in Kootenai County to Gary 
and Carol Sword (the Swords). Gerald allowed the Swords to take possession of the 
house and continue living there and making improvements to the property over a period 
of approximately 3 years. During that time the Swords made monthly payments to Gerald 
and substantial improvements to the property. In November of2000, Gerald and his wife 
initiated eviction and slander of title claims against the Swords. Swords countered for 
specific performance and/or a lien for the value of their improvements. Gerald claimed 
that any agreement with the Swords was for a leasehold interest, not a grant, but the 
district court concluded that the partial performance, including the improvements to the 
property, was sufficient to overcome the statute of frauds. Gerald and his wife appealed 
arguing, inter alia, that the oral contract was void because Mrs. Love lass did not join in 
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the execution of the agreement. The Supreme Court reasoned that the district court must 
have implicitly concluded that Mrs. Lovelass was estopped from invoking the protective 
provisions ofl.C. § 32·912. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court expressly held that '"conduct from which 
acquiescence can be inferred may be sufficient to establish an estoppel.'" Love/ass, at 
109, 334, (citing Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 301, 305, 658 P.2d 972, 
976 (1983)). The Court further held that "a non-consenting spouse's 'failure to participate 
in the negotiations is not determinative of the issue of estoppel."' Id. The Supreme Court 
considered that Mrs. Lovelass knew that the Swords began living on the property in 1997, 
but also noted that the uncontroverted evidence established that she did not know of or 
consent to the improvements made by the Swords. The Supreme Court ultimately 
concluded that there was nothing to tie her to Gerald's agreement and that "to allow his 
conduct by itself to bind her would defeat the purpose ofi.C. § 32-912." !d. 
As in Love/ass, the innocent spouse's testimony in the present case conclusively 
negates a finding of reliance and estoppel. Rebecca Jarvis has testified that she did not 
have any interaction with Snake River at any time, that she was not involved in the 
operations of her husband's construction business and/or its finances, that she was never 
contacted by Snake River about the transaction, and that she did not know anything about 
the transaction. Snake River knew that Josh Jarvis was married and was negligent in its 
failure secure Rebecca Jarvis's signature and acknowledgement on the deed of trust. 
None of that negligence can be attributed to any representations or conduct on her part 
and/or on any reliance by Snake River on any actions of Rebecca Jarvis. As in Love/ass, 
nothing ties Rebecca Jarvis to Josh Jarvis's deed of trust and to allow his conduct alone to 
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bind her would defeat the purpose ofi.C. §32-912. Accordingly, this Court should grant 
summary judgment on Snake River/DAFCO' s claim for estoppel. 
D. The Snake River/DAFCO agency claim is not supported by Idaho law. 
In addition to the estoppel argument, Snake River/DAFCO allege as an alternative 
theory that Josh Jarvis "was acting as an actual or implied agent of [Rebecca Jarvis]." 
Counterclaim, 1f 64. As with the estoppel theory, this argument must fail because Josh 
Jarvis was not any actual agent and Rebecca Jarvis did nothing to create the appearance 
of an implied agency. 
Section 32-912 does provide, "the husband or wife may by express power of 
attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, convey or encumber community 
property, either real or personal." In a unique case decided since the 1974 amendment of 
I.C. § 32-912, the Idaho Court of Appeals, without requiring express power of attorney, 
held that while the statute requires two signatures, "an exception to this general rule 
exists if one spouse is authorized to act as an agent for the management and disposition of 
community property." Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P.2d 22, 27 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (citing Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364, 367, 421 P.2d 444, 
447 (1966)). The statute requires a power of attorney and both Lowry and Noble involved 
express grants of authority. 1 Neither a power of attorney nor an express grant of authority 
exists in the present case and Snake River/DAFCO' s claims must fail as a matter of law. 
Pursuant to the statute, Josh Jarvis needed an express power of attorney to act as 
his wife's agent in encumbering the community property. No such power of attorney 
exists. Setting aside the statutory requirement, Rebecca Jarvis testified, unequivocally, 
1 In addition to require actual authority, Noble dealt with personal property issues having no relation to I.C. 
§ 32-912. 
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that she did not even know that her husband was incurring debt. It is axiomatic that a 
party who is unaware of a transaction cannot provide another party express authority to 
act as their agent in that transaction. Because Rebecca Jarvis did not know of the 
transaction, it is literally impossible that she could have given her husband actual 
authority as her agent. As a result, the Snake River/DAFCO claim must fail. 
Because Snake River/DAFCO have alleged an implied agency, it can be expected 
that they will argue that Josh Jarvis was an implied agent. There is absolutely no 
authority in Idaho that would allow an implied agent to execute a deed of trust 
encumbering real property in direct violation of I. C. § 32-912. In Lowry, the issue related 
to increasing indebtedness subsequent to the execution of a deed of trust by both spouses. 
In other words, the spouse actually had signed the deed of trust. After the husband 
increased the indebtedness the dispute arose, but the signed document provided that it 
w~ "to secure payment of all such further sums as may hereafter be loaned or advanced 
by the beneficiary herein to the Grantor herein, or any or either of them." The Court 
stated that the "dispositive question is whether she consented to the additional loan, and 
to the commensurately increased encumbrance of the property, by agreeing that the bank 
could make such a loan at her husband's request." Lowry, 116 Idaho at 713. The Court 
held that she did, but that consent was made expressly in the original deed of trust. 
Agency was not implied. 
The present case is obviously distinguished in that Rebecca Jarvis did not consent 
to any loan or encumbrance and was, indisputably, unaware that any loan or encumbrance 
existed. Indeed, Snake River/DAFCO has candidly admitted as much under oath stating, 
"Jarvis's wife has never signed any document releasing her interest in the 
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[Highwillow] property or otherwise consented to the deed of trust Jarvis signed in 
favor of Snake River;" Complaint~ Bonneville County Case No. CV-10-280. As 
previously noted, a judicial admission "gives conclusive effect to the truth of the matter 
admitted." Scalf, supra. It is, therefore, conclusively established that Rebecca Jarvis did 
not authorized Jake Jarvis to act as her agent with respect to the High willow property. 
Because Rebecca Jarvis did not give her husband express authority to encumber their 
community property, Snake River/DAFCO's claim must fail and New Phase is entitled to 
judgment as a matter.oflaw that the Snake River deed of trust is void. 
IV. New Phase is entitled to a judgment of foreclosure pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
6-101. 
Josh and Rebecca Jarvis have been served in this action and have failed to appear 
and defend in a timely manner. They are in default and entry of default has been 
requested. Jarvises have defaulted on payments due to New Phase and New Phase has 
declared all payments due under the terms of its agreement with Jarvises. Jarvises are 
indebted to New Phase in the principal sum of$168,730.86 plus interest. Complaint for 
Foreclosure,,, 24-25. 
Idaho Code §6-101(1) and (2) provides: 
There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or the 
enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter. In such action the court may, by its judgment, direct a 
sale ofthe incumbered property (or so much thereof as may be 
necessary) and the application of the proceeds of the sale to the 
payment of the costs ofthe court and the expenses of the sale, 
and the amount due to the plaintiff; ... The provisions ofthis 
section must be construed in order to permit a secured creditor to 
realize upon collateral for a debt or other obligation agreed upon 
by the debtor and creditor. 
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As shown above, New Phase has the superior priority security interest in the 
Highwillow property. Pursuant to the statute, this Court may enter judgment to direct a 
sale of the High willow property with proceeds from that sale being applied to the 
payment ofNew Phases court costs, the expenses of the sale and the $168,730.86 plus 
interest owed by Jarvises to New Phase. Furthermore, the Court must construe the statute, 
but its own terms, in order to permit New Phase to realize upon the co11ateral for the debt 
agreed upon between it and the Jarvises. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, New Phase respectfu1ly request entry of summary 
judgment resolving this matter and ordering the sale of the Highwillow property. 
J e .AI en 
eard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI-JARVIS, husband and wife, 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, lNC., an Idaho 
corporation, DAFCO LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE ·AND LABOR, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, lNC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATION, a Utah corporation, NEILS & 
JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., 
a/k/a NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation 
Defendants. 
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DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
v. 
Counter-claimant/cross-
claimant/third-party plaintiff 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC an 
Idaho limited liability company; 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA MICHAEL 
JARVIS; REBECCA JARVIS aka BECKY 
JARVIS aka REBECCA CHIAPPINI aka 
BECKY CHIAPPINI; STATE OF IDAHO; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
UNITED SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a 
BOB'S INSULATION; NEILS & JOE'S 
LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., a!k/a 
NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation 
Cross-defendants 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOMMERS dtb/a S & H Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RUDY dtb/a Affordable 
Tile & Flooring; WADE ALLEN 
THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN CENTRAL 
VACUUM SYSTEMS; BURNS 
CONCRETE, INC.; an Idaho corporation; 
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
Third-Party Defendants. 
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COMES NOW Defendant, Counterclaimant, Cross-claimant, and Third-party Plaintiff 
DAFCO, LLC, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby moves this 
Court for summary judgment in favor of DAFCO, LLC, and against New Phase Investments, LLC 
("New Phase") and Joshua Jarvis ("Joshua") finding as follows: 
1. That Cross-defendant Joshua has defaulted on the obligations imposed by a Note 
dated March 13, 2008, secured by a Deed of Trust of even date; that pursuant to an 
assignment dated April 17, 2008, DAFCO, LLC is the holder of the Note and the 
beneficiary of the Deed of Trust. 
2. That under the terms of the Note, Joshua owes the following amounts: 
(a) $294,162.34 in principal, interest and penalties accrued to June 9, 2010; 
(b) additional interest accruing at the rate of$76.71 per day after June 9, 2010, 
until the date of Judgment; 
(c) additional penalties in the amount of $2,000.00 to be added on June 18, 
2010, and on the 18th day of each month thereafter until the date ofJudgment; 
(d) court costs incurred in this action and attorney fees allowed by the Court. 
3. That a money Judgment be entered against Joshua for the amounts identified in 
Paragraph 2 above. 
4. That, by virtue of its DeedofTrust, DAFCO, LLC has an interest in the real property 
described as 
Lot 25, Block 18, Comore Lorna, Division No. 23, County of Bonneville, 
State ofidaho, according to the plat recorded June 21, 2006 as Instrument No. 
1227833; 
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that DAFCO, LLC's interest in the property constitutes a paramount lien on the 
property and is superior to any estate, right, title or claim, in law or equity, held by any 
Counter-defendant, Cross-defendant, or Third-party Defendant. 
5. That it be adjudged and decreed that the DAFCO Deed of Trust be foreclosed and that 
judgment be entered providing: 
(a) that the above described property be sold by the sheriff of Bonneville 
County, Idaho; 
(b) that the proceeds of the sale be applied in payment of the amount due to 
DAFCO, LLC, as specified in Paragraph 2 above; 
(c) that all Counter-defendants, Cross-defendants, and Third-party Defendants, 
and all persons claiming under them subsequent to the execution and 
recording of the DAFCO Deed of Trust upon the above described property, 
either as purchasers, encumbrancers, or otherwise, are barred and foreclosed 
from all right, claim, or equity of redemption in and to the above described 
property except as provided in Idaho Code § 45-113. 
6. That DAFCO, LLC, or any party to this proceeding may become a purchaser at such 
sale; that DAFCO, LLC be allowed to make a credit bid at such sale in any amount 
not exceeding the total judgment; that the sheriff ofBonneville County execute a deed 
and certificate of sale to the purchaser; that the purchaser be let into possession of the 
property on the production of the certificate of sale thereof. 
7. That the Court retain jurisdiction following such sale for the purpose of establishing 
the reasonable value of the above described property to award DAFCO, LLC 
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judgment and execution against Cross-defendant Joshua for any deficiency which may 
remain after applying the following to the satisfaction of the judgment againstJ oshua 
described in Paragraph 2 above: all ofthe net proceeds received from the sale of the 
property, or the reasonable value of the above described property, whichever is 
greater. 
'This Cross-Motion is made for the reason that there is no dispute regarding the material facts 
of this case and DAFCO, LLC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This Cross-Motion is 
supported by the pleadings on file in this action (including DAFCO, LLC's Answer, Counter·claim, 
Cross-claim, and Third-party Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Deed of Trust), the Affidavit of 
Deborah Criddle, the Affidavit of Daniel Dansie in Support ofDAFCO; LLC's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Amounts Due executed by David Patterson, and the Brief in 
Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support ofDAFCO's of Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, all of which are submitted concurrently herewith. 
""' DATED: June :l_, 2010 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, 
Charles A. Homer ~ 
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NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
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vs. 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI-JARVIS, husband and wife, 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, JNC., an Idaho 
corporation, DAFCO LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
JNSULATION, a Utah corporation, NEILS & 
JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., 
alk/a NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation 
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DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
v. 
Counter-claimant/cross-
claimant/third-party plaintiff 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC an 
Idaho limited liability company; 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA MICHAEL 
JARVIS; REBECCA JARVIS aka BECKY 
JARVIS aka REBECCA CHIAPPINI aka 
BECKY CHIAPPINI; STATE OF IDAHO; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
UNITED SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a 
BOB'S INSULATION; NEILS & JOE'S 
LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., a/k/a 
NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation 
Cross-defendants 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOMMERS d/b/a S & H Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RUDY d/b/a Affordable 
Tile & Flooring; WADE ALLEN 
THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN CENTRAL 
VACUUM SYSTEMS; BURNS 
CONCRETE, INC.; an Idaho corporation; 
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
Third-Party Defendants. 
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COMES NOW, DAFCO, LLC by and through its counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn 
& Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit this Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support ofDAFCO's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
At its core, this case involves a dispute over the priority of deeds of trust held by two 
creditors: DAFCO, LLC ("DAFCO"), through a deed of trust assigned to it by Snake River Funding, 
Inc. ("SRF"); and New Phase Investments, LLC (''New Phase"). Both creditors lent money to a 
contractor named Joshua Jarvis ("Joshua"). The deeds of trust held by both creditors encumber a 
parcel of real property in the Comora Lorna neighborhood in Bonneville County, Idaho. Joshua 
obtained the property after his marriage, but the deed of trust given to SRF and later assigned to 
DAFCO (the "SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust") is not signed by Joshua's wife, Rebecca Chiappini 
Jarvis ("Rebecca"). 
It is undisputed that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was executed and recorded prior to the 
deeds of trust under which New Phase claims priority. It is also undisputed that New Phase had actual 
knowledge of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust before it received the deeds of trust at issue in this 
case. Normally, these two facts would conclusively establish the first-position priority of the SRF I 
DAFCO Deed of Trust. In an attempt to supersede the priority of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust, 
New Phase has raised a single argument: that the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofT rust is invalid under Idaho 
Code§ 32-912. Though the argument takes several forms, the gravamen is New Phase's contention 
that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust does not constitute a valid encumbrance on the Property 
because Rebecca did not sign it. 
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As explained more fully below, New Phase's argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, 
the purpose of the statute in question is to protect the interests of the community. The statute cannot 
be used as a sword by a third-party creditor with a junior lien. Second, Rebecca has not questioned 
or challenged the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. As the non~signing member of the 
community, she is the person entitled to the protections of the statute. However, she has not contested 
DAFCO's allegation that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust is a valid encumbrance on the property 
which is superior to any interest, including a community interest, which she has in the Property. In 
fact, this Court has already entered a judgment against Rebecca finding any interest which she has in 
the Property to be junior to DAFCO's lien. Third, neither the judicial admission nor the judicial 
estoppel doctrines prevent DAFCO from asserting the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
Fourth, assuming arguendo that Rebecca did challenge the validity of the SRF /DAFCO Deed of 
Trust, or that New Phase has standing to make a challenge on her behalf, Rebecca has-through 
conduct consistent with the existence of the encumbrance-waived the protections of § 32-912. 
Finally, assuming arguendo that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust did contain a technical defect by 
virtue of only being signed by Joshua, New Phase had actual knowledge of its existence prior to 
taking any of the deeds of trust at issue in this case and, consequently, New Phase took their deeds 
of trust subject to DAFCO's first-position lien. 
For these reasons, the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust is a valid encumbrance on the Property. 
Because the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was recorded frrst, any interest which New Phase has in 
the Property is junior and subject to DAFCO' s lien. Thus, New Phase is not entitled to foreclose its 
interest ahead of DAFCO. Consequently, New Phase is not entitled to summary judgment. 
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Conversely, because DAFCO's lien is valid and is in first position, DAFCO is entitled for foreclose 
its interest and DAFCO is entitled to summary judgment. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
New Phase brought its Complaint for Foreclosure (the "Complaint") against Snake River 
Funding, DAFCO, and a number of other parties. In response, SRF and DAFCO filed an Answer, 
Counterclaim, Cross-claim and Third-party Claim for Judicial Foreclosure of Deed of Trust (the 
"Counterclaim") against New Phase, the other defendants New Phase had sued, and additional 
defendants. Based on the following facts, the Court can completely resolve all claims and allegations 
raised in DAFCO's answer I counterclaim through DAFCO's motion for summary judgment. This 
Court has entered default judgment against cross-defendant Rebecca. The IRS and the State ofidaho 
have disclaimed any interest in the property. Medical Recovery Services has stipulated to a judgment 
which gives DAFCO priority over Medical Recovery Services' judgment lien. The two title 
companies, third-party defendants Arnerititle, Inc. and First American Title Company, Inc., will also 
stipulate to a judgment which gives DAFCO priority over·any interest they have in the Property. All 
other cross-defendants or third-party defendants have been dismissed. Thus, the only individuals or 
entities against whom DAFCO's claims are yet to be adjudicated are New Phase and Joshua. For the 
reasons set forth below, this Court should enter summary judgment in favor ofDAFCO against those 
two defendants. 
FACTS 
DAFCO does not dispute the facts set forth in New Phase's Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Mem.") except as set forth below: 
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I. DAFCO disputes paragraph SofNew Phases's statement of facts to the extent that it 
contains an implication that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust did not convey a 
security interest Nevertheless, the interpretation and legal effect of the SRF I DAFCO 
Deed of Trust are questions of law for this Court, not questions of fact. 
2. The assignment of SRF's interest to DAFCO, referenced in paragraph 6 of New 
Phase's statement of facts occurred on Apri117, 2008. 
3. In paragraph 21 ofNew Phase's statement offacts DAFCO disputes the allegation 
regarding "admissions" purportedly made by DAFCO. New Phase's assessment that 
any of DAFCO's statements constitute "admissions" is a legal conclusion, not a 
statement of fact. Moreover, as illustrated in this brief, statements made by DAFCO 
in a separate but related lawsuit do not constitute admissions. 
DAFCO also submits the following as undisputed facts relevant to the Court's evaluation of 
the pending summary judgment motions: 
1. The following deeds oftrust1 encumber, or encumbered, the property referred to in 
paragraph 3 ofNew Phase's statement of facts (the "Property") and are relevant to the 
parties' motions for summary judgment: (a) a deed of trust dated March 7, 2008, 
identifying New Phase as the beneficiary and securing an obligation in the amount of 
$55,000.00-this obligation has been repaid and this deed of trust is no longer 
outstanding; (b) a deed of trust dated March 13, 2008, and recorded on March 18, 
1 A copy of the March 7, 2008, New Phase deed of trust is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit ofDeborah Criddle, filed 
herewith. A copy ofthe March 13, Snake River Funding deed of trust (the "SRF I DAFCO Deed ofTrust") is attached as Exhibit D 
to the Affidavit of Deborah Criddle. A copy of the April 3, 2008, New Phase deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit G to the Affidavit 
of Deborah Criddle. A copy of the October 28, 2008, New Phase deed of trust is attached as Exhibit C to New Phase's Complaint 
A copy of the November 3, 2008, New Phase deed of trust is attached as Exhibit E to·New Phase's Complaint. 
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2008, identifying Snake River Funding as the beneficiary and securing an obligation 
in the amountof$268,000.00 (the "SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust"); (c) a deed of trust 
dated April 3, 2008, and recorded April 7, 2008, identifying New Phase as the 
beneficiary and securing an obligation in the amount of$42,000.00; (d) a deed of trust 
dated October 28, 2008, identifying New Phase as the beneficiary and securing an 
obligation in the amount of $42,000.00; (e) a deed of trust dated November 3, 2008, 
identifying New Phase as the beneficiary and securing an obligation in the amount of 
$140,000.00. 
2. SRF provided Joshua with a construction loan of$268,000.00 to build a home on the 
Property. In return for the loan, SRF took a note executed by Joshua on March 13, 
2008 (the "Note"). The Note was secured by the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. 2 
3. At the time SRF provided the construction loan, Joshua did business as J's 
Construction. 3 
4. DAFCO is the current holder of the Note and the assignee of the SRF I DAFCO Deed 
of Trust . (Affidavit of Amounts Due, , 2.) 
5. Joshua has not repaid the loan and has defaulted on the terms of the Note. As of June 
9, 2010, Joshua owes $294,162.34 in principal and interest with interest continuing 
to accrue at the rate of $76.71 per day until the date of judgment and late payment 
2 A copy of the Note is attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Deborah Criddle. 
3 Joshua and Rebecca executed an affidavit on October 28, 2008, stating that "Joshua is a home builder and conducts 
business under the name J' s Construction." The affidavit states that all of Rebecca's and Joshua's property has been acquired since 
their marriage. It further states that the home on the Property was "built on speculation." A copy of the October 28, 2008, affidavit 
is attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Daniel Dansie filed herewith. 
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penaltiesof$2,000.00permonthaccruingonJune 18,2010, and the 18thdayofeach 
month thereafter until the date of judgment. (Affidavit of Amounts Due,~ 3-5.) 
6. Rebecca has never disputed the validity ofthe SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
7. This Court has entered judgment against Rebecca in this matter finding, inter alia, that 
DAFCO's interest in the Property is "paramount in time and superior to any estate, 
right, title or claim" which Rebecca may have and that any interest she has, "including 
a community property interest, is subordinate to the interest of [DAFCO] created by 
the DAFCO Deed of Trust." (Default Judgment (Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis) at 3-4.) 
8. Joshua has never disputed the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
9. Proceeds from the loan secured by the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust were used to pay 
off the $55,000.00 Property purchase loan from New Phase. Joshua's business, fs 
Construction, received at least $8,000.00 directly from SRF as part of the loan secured 
by the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. SRF also used proceeds from the loan secured 
bythe SRF /DAFCO DeedofTrusttopay J's Construction's creditors. (CriddleAff. 
, 11.) 
10. Rebecca used J's Construction monies to make personal and family purchases 
including, but not limited to tanning, school lunches for her children, day care and 
baby sitting, rent, utilities for her home, groceries, clothing, household items, 
footwear, pet supplies, entertainment, cable tv, and internet service. (Rebecca Jarvis 
Depo., 23:15-29:20 and 32:2-4l 
4 The Deposition of Rebecca Jarvis and exhibits from that deposition are attached to the Affidavit of Daniel Dansie as 
Exhibit F and Exhibit G. 
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11. Deborah Criddle, a loan officer at A very Financial, told David Lawrence, a co-owner 
of New Phase, about the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust before New Phase made the 
loan secured by the April 3, 2008, deed of trust referred to in paragraph 7 of New 
Phase's statement of facts. (Criddle Aff., 12.) 
12. Joshua gave New Phase security interests in various items of personal property, 
including 4x4s, snow machines, and trailers, to secure the April2008loan from New 
Phase. (Criddle Aff. , 13.) 
13. In September 2008, DAFCO and New Phase held a meeting to discuss the priorities 
of the various encumbrances on the Property. This meeting was attended by David 
Patterson, the principal of New Phase, Jeff A very, the principal of Snake River 
Funding, Wayne Jones and David Lawrence, the principals of New Phase, and 
Deborah Criddle, a loan officer at A very Financial. At the meeting, the parties 
discussed the fact that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was recorded before any of 
the then-outstanding New Phase deeds of trust. (Criddle Aff. mJ 16-18.) 
14. On October 28, 2008, and November 3, 2008, New Phase recorded the deeds of trust 
under which it claims priority in this case. (Complaint at 7.) 
ARGUMENT 
New Phase's position that it is entitled to summary judgment against DAFCO and Snake 
River Funding relies on four arguments: (1) that the property is community property and cannot be 
conveyed without the signature of both spouses; (2) that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust is void and 
that recording it cannot provide notice; (3) that the 'judicial admission" doctrine prevents DAFCO 
from asserting the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust; and (4) that DAFCO cannot rely on 
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the doctrine of equitable estoppel to support its deed.5 For the reasons discussed below, New Phase 
cannot prevail on any of these theories. New Phase is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and 
the Court should deny its motion for summary judgment Moreover, New Phase's inability to prevail 
on any of its theories, in light of the undisputed fact that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was 
recorded first, demonstrates that DAFCO is entitled to summary judgment. 
1. New Phase Cannot Rely on Idaho Code § 32-912 to Dispute the SRF I DAFCO Deed of 
Trust Because New Phase is Not a Member of the Marital Community and Thus is Not 
Protected by That Section. 
a. The Two Signature Rule is Established For the Protection of the Community, 
Not Third Party Creditors. 
Idaho Courts have long held that the purpose of Idaho's two signature rule is ''the protection 
of the community." Finlayson v. Waller, 64 Idaho 618, 134 P.2d 1069 (1943); accord Tew v. 
Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53,480 P.2d 896, 899 (1971) ("[T]his statute was enacted for the purpose 
of protecting the community.") Brown v. Burnside, 94 Idaho 363, 366, 487 P.2d 957, 960 (1971) 
("The statute exists for the protection of the wife's interest in the community ... ").Even the case 
which New Phase relies on to support its motion for summary judgment, United States v. McConkey, 
expressly states that the statute "was intended to protect a wife's vested interest in community 
property against the possibility of the husband's dissipation of it without the wife's consent or 
acquiescence." 430 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
New Phase has cited to no authority for the proposition that a junior creditor who is a stranger 
to the transaction at issue can use§ 32-912 as a sword to invalidate a senior, recorded interest of 
5 New Phase's summary judgment briefal.so asserts that Joshua was not Rebecca's agent when he signed the SRF I DAFCO 
Deed of Trust. Pl.'s Mem. at 22. Although DAFCO contends that Joshua was acting as Rebecca's implied agent, DAFCO is not 
contesting that point on summary judgment. In any event, that issue is not dispositive of either party's summary judgment motion. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Joshua was not Rebecca's agent, this Court can-and should--deny New Phase's motion and grant 
DAFCO's cross-motion for the reasons set forth in the text. 
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which it had actual knowledge. Instead, Idaho case law demonstrates that in the appropriate 
circumstances§ 32-912 maybe used by the members of the community (or their estates) as a shield 
to protect the community's interest in real property. See, e.g., Love lass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 105, 90 
P.3d 330 (2004) (wife used the statute to invalidate an agreement to convey property entered into by 
husband without wife's written consent); Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (wife attempted to use the statute to invalidate a deed of trust burdening community 
property but the court held that she was estopped by conduct which was consistent with the existence 
and validity of the instrument); Kellerv. Rogstad, 112 Idaho484, 733 P.2d 705 (1987) (wife used the 
statute to invalidate a conveyance of community property by husband in which she had not joined); 
Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 301, 658 P.2d 972 (1983) (wives attempted to use 
the statute to invalidate a transfer which they had not signed but the court found a question of fact 
about whether, by their conduct, the wives had waived the protections of the statute); Tew v. 
Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971) (noting that the statute "cannot be invoked to gain 
advantage over the community"); United States v. McConkey, 430 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(administrator of husband's estate used the statute to invalidate an encumbrance on community 
property); Fairchildv. Wiggins, 85 Idaho 402,380 P.2d6 (1963) (the community used the statute to 
invalidate a conveyance which the wife had not signed); Knudsen v. Lythman, 33 Idaho 794, 200 P. 
130 (wife used the statute to invalidate a mortgage on community property because the conveyance 
did not conform with the statute's acknowledgment provision). 
In short, the purpose of the statute is to protect the interests of both members of the 
community. Each member ofthe community may use the statute in the appropriate circumstances as 
a shield to prevent unilateral transfers of community property made by the other spouse. The statute 
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is not intended to be a sword in disputes between competing creditors of the community. New Phase 
has offered no authority showing or suggesting that it, as a non-party to the transaction, can use the 
statute to invalidate the SRF I DAFCO Deed of trust. 
b. New Phase Cannot Stand in the Shoes of the Members of the Community, 
Particularly Where the Non-Signing Spouse Has Not Contested the Validity of 
the Deed. 
Because the purpose of the statute is to aid the members of the community, New Phase cannot 
use § 32-912 to its benefit. New Phase is not a member of the community. The uncontested facts of 
this case show that neither member of the community has disputed or challenged the validity of the 
lien created by the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. Specifically, in the Counterclaim, SRF and DAFCO 
alleged that "DAFCO has a first lien in and to the Property," that "[t]he interests of the defendants, 
and each of them, in the Property are inferior and subordinate to the lien of DAFCO described 
herein," and that "DAFCO is entitled to an order and decree that [Rebecca's] community property 
interest in the Property is encumbered by the DAFCO Deed of Trust" (Counterclaim at 16, 18.) 
Neither Joshua nor Rebecca have denied the allegations in the Counterclaim. Allegations which are 
not denied are deemed admitted. Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 8(d). Thus, both members ofthe community have 
admitted the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust, and New Phase has no standing to 
challenge its validity. Moreover, this Court has already entered a judgment against Rebecca in this 
action finding that "any interest which Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis has in the real property at issue in 
this lawsuit, including a community property interest, is subordinate to the interest ... created by the 
DAFCO Deed of Trust." (Default Judgment (Rebecca Chiappini-Jarvis) at 4.) Thus, the validity of 
the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust has been established. 
2. The SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust Gave New Phase Constructive Notice of DAFCO's 
Superior Interest in the Property. 
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a. The SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust is Not Void Ab Initio, and Has Not Been 
Declared Void in Any Judicial Proceeding. 
A conveyance which does not strictly comport with the provisions of§ 32-912 is voidable, 
not per se void. "Contracts to convey or encumber community realty are voidable if they lack the 
wife's signature" and in certain circumstances the wife is estopped from nullifying the conveyance. 
Louron Industries, Inc. v. Holman, 7 Wash.App. 834, 840,502 P.2d 1216, 1219 (1972). "While it 
is true that a contract to convey community real estate is void if not signed and acknowledged by both 
the husband and wife under this statute, this is not an inexorable rule and conduct from which an 
acquiescence can be inferred may be sufficient to establish an estoppel." Love lass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 
105, 109, 90 P.3d 330, 334 (2004) (citing Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53,480 P.2d 896, 899 
(1971) and Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 301, 305, 658 P.2d 792, 976 (1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 6 The statute's two-signature requirement is not an "inexorable rule 
.. [and] a party can waive the protective requirements ofLC. § 32-912." Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 
Idaho 708, 711, 779 P .2d 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1989) (Citing Tew, 94 Idaho at 54, 480 P .2d at 900). Where 
a non-signing spouse "subsequently sanctions or ratifies [the signing spouse's] act, neither she nor 
the community may thereafter disaffirm" a conveyance. Whiting v. Johnson, 64 W ash.2d 135, 141, 
3 90 P .2d 985, 988 (1964). If all conveyances executed without twn signatures were per se void, there 
would be no reason for the long-standing rule that compliance with the statute is not necessary where 
the non-signing spouse's conduct is consistent with acquiescence to the transfer. 
6 In 1961, a federal district court did hold contrary ·without citing any Idaho cases in support. Reiman v. United States, 196 
F. Supp. (D. Idaho 1961). However, this holding is not consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court position that a wife's failure to join 
a conveyance does not doom that conveyance in all cases. Indeed, the proviso clearly endorsed in Love/ass, Calvin, and Tew shows 
that such encumbrances are voidable, not void. 
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InSanderv. Wells~ 71 Wash.2d25,426P.2d481 (1967), the Washington court-interpreting 
a statute substantively identical to § 32-912-discussed the effect of a single signature on a 
conveyance. "Contracts which convey or encumber community realty and which lack the wife's 
signature are Voidable not Void." !d. at 28, 426 P.2d 481. "Unless rescinded or otherwise avoided, 
a voidable contract imposes upon the parties the same obligations as if it were not voidable.,, Id. at 
29, 426 P.2d 484. There the Washington court upheld a conveyance that was not signed by the wife 
and gave two reasons for doing so: first, the wife "failed to avoid a voidable contract," and second, 
based on her conduct which was consistent with the existence of the conveyance she "was estopped 
to avoid or deny the validity of the mortgage." Id. 
Like the mortgage in Sander, the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofTrust is voidable, not void. Neither 
this Court nor any other tribunal has declared the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust to be void.7As noted 
above, neither Joshua nor Rebecca have contested the validity of the deed. Neither Joshua nor 
Rebecca contested the allegations in DAFCO' s Counterclaim that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust 
is a valid and binding encumbrance on the entire community interest in the Property. 
Under the facts of this case, the protections of§ 32-912 exist for Rebecca's benefit as the non-
signing spouse. However, she has not denied the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust and has 
not initiated any proceeding seeking to invalidate that instrument. Indeed, this Court has already held 
contrary in the judgement issued against Rebecca: " [A ]ny interest which Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis 
has in the real property at issue in this lawsuit, including a community property interest, is subordinate 
7 Indeed, for the reasons contained set forth in this brief, the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofT rust is valid and it would be improper 
for any court to declare otherwise. 
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Jarvis) at 4.) 
In short, the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofTrust is a valid conveyance and is a binding encumbrance 
on the Property. 
b. Because the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust is Not Void, and Because it was 
Recorded First, New Phase Had Constructive Notice Under Idaho Code§ 55-606. 
Idaho's recording statute says that "[ e ]very grant or conveyance of an estate in real property 
is conclusive against the grantor, and also every one subsequently claiming under him, except a 
purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires title or lien 
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded." Idaho Code§ 55-606. The act of 
recording a conveyance "is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and 
mortgagees." Idaho Code § 55-811. 
As noted above, the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was not void from inception and has never 
been declared invalid by any tribunal. Consequently, it is a valid deed and its recording provided to 
subsequent encumbrancers constructive notice of the lien created thereby. It is undisputed that the 
SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was recorded on March 18, 2008, prior to any of the New Phase deeds 
at issue in this case. Because those New Phase deeds were recorded after the SRF I DAFCO Deed of 
Trust was recorded, the conveyance to SRF I DAFCO is "conclusive" against Joshua, as grantor, and 
against New Phase claiming under after-recorded deeds of trust. 8 Thus, the SRF I DAFCO Deed of 
8 Idaho Code § 55-606 prevents New Phase from asserting priority over the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust for another 
reason: New Phase is not a bona fide purchaser and thus did not acquire title "in good faith." As explained in Section 5, infra, New 
Phase had actual knowledge of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust when it took the deeds of trust at issue in this case. Thus, assuming, 
arguendo, that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust did not give constructive notice, New Phase is still subordinate because it is 
undisputed that it had actual knowledge of the earlier encumbrance. 
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Trust has priority over any of the New Phase deeds at issue in this case and New Phase is not entitled 
to summary judgment against DAFCO. 
3. TheJudiciaiAdmissionDoctrineDoesNotPreventDAFCOFromAssertingtheValidity 
of the Deed of Trust in This Lawsuit. 
New Phase argues that the alleged deficiency of the DAFCO I Snake River Funding Deed of 
Trust has been "conclusively established" by virtue a of statement made by Defendants in a separate 
lawsuit. (Pl.'s Mem. at 15.) New Phase claims that Defendants' statement constitutes a ')ud.icial 
admission" which is binding on the party making it. (Pl.'s Mem. at 15-16.) New Phase asserts that 
the following statements made in an action involving DAFCO and a title insurance companY' are 
"judicial admissions," the existence of which entitles New Phase to summary judgment: 
Stewart [Title Guaranty Company] should have, to have clear title to 
the Sagewood [Comore Lorna] property, required that Jarvis's wife 
sign a quitclaim deed or other instrument to renounce any interest in 
the same ... Jarvis's wife has never signed any document releasing 
her interest in the Sagewood [Comore Lorna] property or otherwise 
consented to the deed of trust Jarvis signed in favor of Snake River. 
(Pl.'s Mem. at 15; Allen Aff., Ex. U.) 
New Phase's judicial admission argument is inapposite in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has explicitly stated: "[W]e have held that judicial admissions do not include a party's allegation in 
a complaint filed in a separate but related action." In re Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751, 759, 
171 P.3d 242, 250 (2007). The statements at issue here were not made in the instant action but in a 
separate lawsuit to which New Phase is not a party. Because they were made in "a separate but related 
action" any statements made by DAFCO are not ')udicial admissions." Thus, contrary toN ew Phase's 
9 See Snake River Funding, LLC, andD.A.F.C. 0., LLCv. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., Bonneville County Case No. CV -lO-
280. 
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argument, these statements cannot be used to "conclusively establish" the alleged invalidity of the 
SRF I DAFCO Deed ofTrust.10 
Moreover, in this case New Phase cannot rely on the judicial admission doctrine to establish 
the invalidity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust because a '"A judicial admission is a deliberate, 
clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact within the party's peculiar knowledge, 
not a matter oflaw .... [and] not opinion."' Universal Life, 144 Idaho at 759, 171 P.3d at 250 (citing 
29A Am.Jur.2d, Evidence§ 770). In Universal Life, the court found that the statement at issue in that 
case did "not constitute a judicial admission. It was not made for the purpose, or with the effect, of 
dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact. Insofar as is relevant here, it 
was not a statement of fact; it was a statement oflaw or opinion regarding the interpretation of the 
SBA Policies." Id. at 759-60, 171 P.3d at 250-51. 
The statements in this case are not 'Judicial admissions" because they do not set forth an 
admission of a disputed fact. The first statement--that the title company should have required 
Rebecca to sign a quit claim deed in order to have "clear title" to the Property-is merely a "statement 
oflaw" or "opinion" regarding the interpretation of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. (See Pl.'s Rule 
56( f) Mem. at 6 (identifying the statement "Rebecca Jarvis's signature was necessary to clear title" 
as a ')udicial admission").) The second statement-that Rebecca has not signed an instrument 
10 At the Apri119, 2010, hearing on DAFCO's Rule 56(:t) motion, the Court sua sponte raised the issue of the judicial 
estoppel doctrine. New Phase has only argued that it is entitled to summruy judgment under the judicial admission doctrine, not under 
judicial estoppel. Nevertheless, New Phase still could not prevail under a judicial estoppel theory. First, DAFCO does not concede 
that the statements made it the separate proceeding to which New Phase refers, Bonneville County Case No. CV-10·280, are 
"inconsistenf' with the position DAFCO takes in the instant case. See Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 
Idaho 737, 748, 215 P.3d 457, 468 (2009). Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, that DAFCO's position in the other case was 
inconsistent, that alone is not enough. The Idaho Supreme Court recently stated that a party asserting judicial estoppel "must show 
that the sworn statement at issue was used to obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration from another party." State, ex rel. 
Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, --, 224 P.3d 1109, 1110 n.S (20IO)(emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). After stating the rule, the Maybee court denied the State's judicial estoppel claim because the State "failed to meet this 
burden." Id Similarly, New Phase cannot point to any judgment, advantage, or consideration which DAFCO has received from 
another party to the instant lawsuit as a result of the statements made in the separate proceeding. 
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releasing her interest or consented to the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofTrust-is not a 'judicial admission" 
because it does not involve a disputed fact. It is undisputed that Rebecca has never signed an 
instrument releasing her interest. However, as explained elsewhere in this brief, Rebecca does not 
need to sign a document to validate the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust On the contrary, the deed is 
valid-even without her signature-until she contests the deed and it is judicially invalidated. It is 
undisputed that Rebecca has never actively contested the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofT rust, 
has never commenced proceedings to invalidate the deed, and has never asserted that she has an 
interest in the Property which is paramount to DAFCO' s interest. 
In short, Universal Life is dispositive of the judicial admission issue. Any statements made 
by Defendants in a separate lawsuit are not judicial admissions binding in this case. Moreover, 
statements which do not admit contested facts are not judicial admissions. As a result the SRF I 
DAFCO Deed of Trust is not invalid under the judicial admission doctrine and New Phase is not 
entitled to summary judgment. 
4. Under the Applicable Idaho Case Law, Rebecca Jarvis Has Waived the Protections of 
Idaho Code§ 32-912's Two-Signature Rule by Acting in a Manner Consistent With the 
Existence of the Encumbrance and by Benefitting Therefrom 
As noted above, Rebecca has, by not denying the allegations in the Counterclaim, admitted 
the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. This Court has already issued a Judgment against 
Rebecca finding that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust is a valid encumbrance on any interest she has, 
including a community property interest, in the Property. These facts are sufficient to establish the 
validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust and, as a result, its priority over any ofthe New Phase 
deeds of trust at issue in this case. Nevertheless, even assuming that Rebecca sought to contest the 
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validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofTrust, she is estopped from doing so because she has, through 
her conduct, waived the protections of§ 32-912. 
a. Under Love/ass, Lowry, and Calvin, A Member of the Community Waives the 
Two-Signature Rule Where Her Conduct is Consistent With the Existence of the 
Validity of the Encumbrance or Where She Benefits from its Existence. 
"While it is true that a contract to convey community real estate is void if not signed and 
acknowledged by both the husband and wife under this statute, this is not an inexorable rule and 
conduct from which an acquiescence can be inferred may be sufficient to establish an estoppel." 
Lovelass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 105, 109, 90 P.3d 330, 334 (2004) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). The protections of the statute are waived where "the conduct of the non-consenting 
spouse is consistent with the existence and validity of the disputed contract." Id. at 108,90 P.3d at 
333. "[A] spouse will bedeemedtohavewaived [a] defect [under§ 32-912] wherehisorherconduct 
is consistent with the existence and validity of the instrument." Lowry v.Jreland Bank~ 116 Idaho 708, 
779 P.2d22 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Tewv. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 54,480 P.2d 896,900 (1971)). 
Under Lovelass and Lowry, the appropriate standard for determining whether a non-signing spouse 
has waived the protections of§ 32-912 is whether that spouse's conduct is consistent with existence 
and validity of the obligation. 
New Phase asserts that DAFCO must show "false or misleading statements or conduct by 
Rebecca Jarvis" in order to show that Rebecca has waived the protections of§ 3 2-912. (Pl.'s Mem. 
at 17-18.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court has not always required a party to prove all the 
elements of equitable estoppel in order to find a waiver of the statute. In Love lass, the court only 
looked to whether the wife's conduct was consistent with the existence of a conveyance, not whether 
she had made any false or misleading statement. 140 Idaho at 108-09, 90 P.3d at 333-34. Similarly, 
Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Support ofDAFCO's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Page 19 
204 
in Lowry, the court fo1md that the wife waived the protections of the statute because "her conduct was 
consistent with the existence of a valid encumbrance." 116 Idaho at 711, 779 P .2d at 25. The court 
did not even address the question of whether the wife had made any false or misleading statements 
and made finding to that effect. I d. 
Even more instructive on this issue is Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 301, 
658 P.2d 972 (1983). In Calvin, the court specifically distinguished an earlier case Fairchild v. 
Wiggins, 85 Idaho 402, 3 80 P .2d 6 ( 1963 ), which held that the non-signing wife who knew about the 
a transfer but who had made no false representation had not waived the protections of§ 32-912. 104 
Idaho at 304-05, 658 P.2d at 975-76. In Calivn, the court explicitly rejected the argument that "in 
order to establish an estoppel [or waiver of§ 32-912] against them, Calvin had to prove that Tiene and 
RosaRupp falsely represented or concealed a material fact." Id. at 305,658 P.2d at 976. Instead, the 
Court noted that the standard for determining whether a non-signing spouse had waived the 
protections of the statute is whether he or she "was either 'actually aware of the contract' to convey 
the property in question or 'actually participated [in] and benefitted from the contract during its 
duration."' Id (citing Brown v. Burnside, 94 Idaho 363, 366,487 P.2d 957, 960 (1971)). By using the 
disj1mctive "or," the Calvin holding shows that even if the non-signing spouse is unaware of the 
conveyance she will be estopped from asserting§ 32-912's protections if she actually benefits from 
the conveyance. 
This Court need not find a false or misleading statement by Rebecca in order to hold that she 
has waived the protections of§ 32-912. Rather, she will have waived the statute's protections if she 
has acted in a manner consistent with the existence of the encumbrance or if she participated in and 
benefitted from the conveyance. 
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b. The Facts of This Case Establish That Rebecca Jarvis Appreciated the Benefit 
Conferred Upon Her By the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
The facts of this case are more than sufficient to demonstrate that Rebecca's conduct was 
consistent with the existence of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust and that she benefitted from its 
existence. 
It is undisputed that at the time of the SRF made the loan to Joshua which was secured by the 
SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust, Joshua was in the construction business. (Criddle Aff., ~ 4.) Joshua 
conducted his business under the name "J' s Construction." (Dansie Aff., Ex. C.) It is also undisputed 
that the loan secured by the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was intended to fund the construction of 
a home on the Property. (Criddle Aff., ~ 10.) The loan secured by the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust 
benefitted the J' s Construction business by providing funds to pay expenses incurred by J' s 
Construction. (Joshua Jarvis Rule 2004 Exam., 78:17-79:15.) In addition, J' s Construction received 
atleast$8,000.00 directly from SRF. (CriddleAff., ~ 11, Ex. E.) Rebecca enjoyed a benefit from the 
loan proceeds flowing to J's Construction by using J's Construction funds to pay for personal and 
family items. 
Rebecca has admitted that she used J' s Construction funds to pay for tanning, school lunches 
for her children, day care and baby sitting, rent, and utilities for their home. (Rebecca Jarvis Depo., 
23:15-29:20.) Rebecca also acknowledged using J's construction funds to pay other personal and 
family expenses such as groceries, clothing, household items, footwear, pet supplies, entertainment, 
cable tv, and internet service. (Rebecca Jarvis Depo., 33:2-4, Ex. 15.) Joshua has also stated that he 
used money from the construction account to pay for family expenses and obligations. (Joshua Jarvis 
Rule 2004 Exam., 75:9-12.) The checks attached to Rebecca's deposition also confirm that funds 
from J's Construction were used to pay for personal and family expenses. (Dansie Aff., Ex. G.) 
Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Support ofDAFCO's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Page 21 
206 
Rebecca testified that she was aware that Joshua was building a home on the Property. 
(Rebecca Jarvis Depo., 14:21-22.) She knewthatthehouse was a spec home. (Dansie Aff., Ex. C.) 
She "hadn't met with any homeowners saying they wanted -you know, they hired him to pay for it--or 
to build it for them specifically." (Rebecca Jarvis Depo., 15:20-22.) Rebecca was aware that J's 
Construction was building a home and knew, or should have known, that the construction was funded 
by a loan to Joshua. Rebecca has admitted that she personally benefitted as a result of the personal 
and family expenses paid by r s Construction. (Rebecca Jarvis Rule 2004 Exam., 48:15-49:13.) Her 
conduct of accepting and using funds from J' s Construction is consistent with the existence of a 
construction loan to Joshua secured by an obligation on the Property. By using the funds from J's 
Construction-which, in turn, benefitted from the note secured by the SRF I DAFCO Deed of 
Trust-Rebecca has "actually participated [in] and benefitted from" the SRF loan secured by the SRF 
I DAFCO DeedofTrust. See Calvin, 104 at305, 658 P.2d at 976. By accepting significantfmancial 
assistance from Joshua's business, Rebecca has acted in a manner "consistent with the existence and 
validity" of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. Lovelass, 140 Idaho at 108, 90 P.3d at 333. 
Consequently, she has waived the protections of§ 32-912 and is estopped from asserting the 
invalidity of the deed. 
5. NewPhase'slnstrumentsAreSubordinatetoDAFCO'sBecauseNewPhaseHadActual 
Knowledge ofthe SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust When It Loaned Money to Jarvis For 
Construction. 
As explained above, the fact that the statute exists for the benefit of the community and neither 
member of the community has challenged the validity of the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofT rust-together 
with the fact that the Court has already issued a judgment in this case declaring Rebecca's interest in 
the Property to be subject to D .. \FCO's lien-conclusively establishes the validity of the SRF I 
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DAFCO Deed of Trust and its paramount lien position. As a result, DAFCO is entitled to summary 
judgment. Nevertheless, New Phase has argued that because the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was 
only signed by Joshua, recordation did not provide constructive notice of DAFCO's lien. This 
argument is unavailing, however, because it is undisputed that New Phase had actual knowledge of 
the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust prior to the taking the deeds under which it claims priority. 
a. A Party Who Takes Property With Actual Knowledge of a Prior-Recorded 
Encumbrance Is Subject to the Prior Deed Notwithstanding Technical Defects. 
"When a subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser has actual knowledge of a prior interest, it 
makes no difference whether the prior interest was properly acknowledge or recorded." Farm Bureau 
Finance Co., Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 747, 605 P .2d 509, 512 (1980); accord Treasure Valley 
Bankv. Butcher, 117 Idaho 974,793 P.2d206 (1990). 
In Treasure Valley Bank, a partnership gave a deed of trust on partnership property to a 
departing partner and subsequently gave a deed of trust on the same property to the bank. 117 Idaho 
at975, 793 P.2d at207. Because of a technical error in the form of the deedoftrustto the departing 
partner, the court held that recordation "conveyed no constructive notice." ld at 978, 793 P .2d at 210. 
Thus, the court held that "without actual knowledge, the bank's lien would have been superior to that 
of [the departing partner]." !d. Nevertheless, the court noted that the bank did have actual knowledge 
that the departing partner had been given a previous security interest on the same property. Because 
of that actual knowledge, the bank was "[a]t a minimum ... put on notice to inquire further. The 
actual notice received by [the bank] in this case renders its security interest inferior to that granted 
to [the departing partner]." !d. 
Similarly, in Ralls v. Fouraker, a quiet title action, the party with a secondary encumbrance 
on a parcel of property defended against the quiet title claim by arguing that her claim to the property 
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was superior because the first encumbrance suffered from a defect. 109 Idaho 488, 492, 708 P .2d 893, 
897 (1985). The court rejected that claim and held that "[w]hen a subsequent encumbrancer or 
purchaser ... has actual knowledge of a prior interest ... it makes no difference whether the prior 
interest was properly acknowledged and recorded." !d. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). In that case, the plaintiffs had allegedly recorded a deed in violation of the bankruptcy 
court's automatic stay provision. Id. However, the defendant had actual knowledge of the deed to the 
plaintiffs. !d. at 491, 708 P.2d at 896. "The recordation of the deed only serves to place on 
constructive notice those who do not have actual notice of the interest of estate held by the grantees 
of the recorded deed." Id. In finding for the plaintiffs, the court held that "although the Ralls' 
recordation of their deed from Gerald Fouraker may have been a nullity, such does not affect the 
actual knowledge possessed by Ileda Fouraker of the Ralls' interest in the property." !d. 
To be clear, it is DAFCO's position that the technical error in this case (the failure to obtain 
the wife's signature) was de minimis and that recodation of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust 
provided constructive notice of the earlier encumbrance. Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, 
recordation of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was initially insufficient to give notice ofDAFCO' s 
lien priority, it is undisputed that New Phase had actual knowledge of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of 
Trust prior to taking deeds of trust for the New Phase loans. Thus, like Treasure Valley Bank, the 
actual notice received by the lender in this case "renders its security instrument inferior" to DAFCO' s 
b. New Phase Had Actual Knowledge of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
According to its Complaint, New Phase claims priority in this action based on deeds of trust 
dated October 28, 2008, and November 3, 2008. (Complaint at 7.) However, it is undisputed that New 
Phase had actuallmowledge of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust prior to the execution of those 
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deeds. Joshua testified that prior to executing the October 28,2008, and November 3, 2008, deeds 
oftrusthe met with New Phase's Wayne Jones who "[t]oldme thatDAFCO and Snake River made 
a mistake in the financing and that we needed to re-sign everything to give them [New Phase] first 
lien position." (Joshua Jarvis Rule 2004 Exam, 7:8-11.) Joshua was motivated to assist New Phase 
in trying to obtain first lien position because "Dave and Wayne were friends of mine and I didn't want 
to-- I guess I didn't want to screw them over, I guess you'd say." (Joshua Jarvis Rule 2004 Exam, 
10: 11-14.) 
Prior to the execution of the October 28,2008, deeds of trust, New Phase was aware of the 
existence of the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofT rust. In September of2008, the principals ofNew Phase and 
DAFCO had a meeting where they discussed the fact that the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust was in 
first position. (Criddle Aff., ~ 16.) According to New Phase's Wayne Jones, the purpose of the 
meeting "was to discuss with Snake River Funding why the heck they were in first position and I 
wasn't.'' (Jones Depo., 35:4-6.) The participants discussed "[t]he loan that Snake River or Avery 
funding had loaned to Jarvis and that they stated they were in first position." (Jones Depo., 3 5: 14-16.) 
New Phase was aware of the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust even before the meeting in 
September of2008. In April of2008, Joshua executed a deed of trust on the Property to New Phase 
to secure a loan to Joshua in the amount of$42,000.00. (Counterclaim at 12; Criddle Aff., ~ 14.) 
Before New Phase made the April2008 loan to Joshua, Deborah Criddle informed David Lawrence, 
a member ofNew Phase than any loan secured by a deed of trust on the property would have priority 
junior to the SRF I DAFCO Deed ofT rust. (Criddle A:ff., ~ 12.) Lawrence stated that "I think we were 
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aware that Snake River Funding had loaned monies when we made our [April2008] loan ... " 11 
(Lawrence Depo., 45:13-15.) 
Based on these facts it is clear that New Phase had actual knowledge ofthe SRF I DAFCO 
Deed of Trust prior to taking the deeds of trust at issue in this case. Because New Phase had actual 
knowledge, New Phase's security interest is inferior to DAFCO' s superior lien. See Treasure Valley 
Bank, 117 Idaho at 978, 793 P.2d at 210. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should deny New Phase's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and should grant DAFCO's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED: June qf)olO 
11 Knowing of the existence of the first-position SRF I DAFCO Deed ofTrust, New Phase only agreed to make the April 
2008 loan to Joshua on the condition that it could secure additional collateral (Criddle Aff. "1!14.) To secure the loan from New Phase 
Joshua gave New Phase security interests in various items of personal property including boats, 4x4s, snow machines, trailers, etc. 
(Criddle Aff. ~~ 13-14.) 
Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Support ofDAFCO's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Page 26 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, with my office in Idaho 
Falls, Idaho, and that on the 5'1"\. day of June, 2010. I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage thereon, 
or by causing the same to be delivered as defined by Rule 5(b), LR.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Jared W. Allen 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Method of Service: 
[] Mail ~ Hand [] Fax 
Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Support ofDAFCO's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
J 
Page 27 
212 
EXHIBITF 
AFFIDAVIT O"F RICHARD H. ANDRUS IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-
Exhibit F 
213 
Michael D. Gaffhey, I.SB No. 355·8 
Jared W. Allen, ISB No. 5793 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
. DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH jUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVIllE COUNTY IDAHO 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI-JARVIS, husband and wife, 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, DAFCO LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND 
LABOR, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATION, a Utah corporation, NEILS 
& JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, 
lNC. A/KIA NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation. 
Defendants. 
DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Counter-claimant/cross-
claimant/third- lainti 
Case No. CV -2010-651 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF 
DAFCO LLC'S CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN 
SUPPORT OF NEW PHASE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Memorandum in Opposition to DAFCO LLC's Cross Motion for Sunnnary Judgment and in 
Support ofNew Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Page 1 
1 
vs. 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA 
MICHAEL JARVIS; REBECCA JARVIS 
aka BECKY JARVIS aka REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI aka BECKY CHIAPPINI; 
STATE OF IDAHO; UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATIONS; NEILS & JOE'S LES 
SCHWAB TIRE STORE,-INC. a/k/a 
NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Cross-defendants, 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOMMERS d/b/a S & H Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RUDY d/b/a 
Affordable Tile and Flooring; WADE 
ALLEN THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN 
CENTRAL VACUUM SYSTEMS; 
BURNS CONTRETE, INC.; an Idaho 
corporation; MEDICAL RECOVERY 
SERVICES, LLC an Idaho limited liability 
company; 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Memorandum in Opposition to DAFCO LLC's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Support ofNew Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Page2 
.1 
New Phase Investments LLC (New Phase), through its attorneys of record, 
respectfully submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to DAFCO LLC's Cross 
Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of its own Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case comes down to one general issue: the SRF/DAFCO LLC Deed of Trust is 
void and cannot function as a valid encumbrance on the property at issue for several reasons. 
Therefore, New Phase has superior priority over DAFCO LLC, Josh and Rebecca Jarvis (the 
Jarvises) are in default, and New Phase is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and 
foreclosure of its liens. 
ARGUMENT 
New Phase is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. DAFCO LLC argues that: 1) 
congress designed Idaho Code §32-912 to protect the interests of the community and cannot 
be used as a sword by a third-party creditor, 2) DAFCO LLC's judicial admissions cannot be 
used to prevent the finding of validity of the DAFCO LLC Deed of Trust, 3) Rebecca has 
waived the protections ofi.C. §32-912 and is estopped from denying the validity of the 
DAFCO Deed ofTrust, and 4) New Phase had actual knowledge of the DAFCO Deed of 
Trust prior to its taking of deeds and therefore was on notice of another creditor. For the 
reasons discussed below, DAFCO LLC cannot prevail on any of these arguments and this 
Court should deny its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Since, none ofDAFCO LLC's 
arguments succeed and its Deed of Trust is void as a matter of law, New Phase is entitled to 
summary judgment in this case. 
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I. DAFCO LLC's Argument that New Phase Cannot Rely on I.C. §32-912 is 
Misplaced. 
First, it is undisputed that the property in question is community property and thus 
falls under the purview ofl.C. §32-912 with regard to management of the property. It is also 
undisputed that Joshua Jarvis' wife, Rebecca did not sign the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
Courts have consistently held that an encumbrance on community property executed by one 
spouse, but not the other, is void. I.C. §32-912; U.S. v. McConkey, 430 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 
1970); Lovelass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 105, 90 P.3d 330 (2004}; Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 
Idaho 708, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989). Since Rebecca did not sign DAFCO LLC's Deed of 
Trust, it is void. DAFCO then argues that the congressional purpose of the statute was to 
protect the community property from creditors, not to protect creditors. DAFCO LLC is only 
correct in its argument to the extent the statute protects the community from the creditor in 
the transaction unless both spouses agree to incur the debt and that the creditor in the 
transaction cannot use the statute to gain an advantage over the community. Lowry, 116 
Idaho at 713. 
However, DAFCO LLC fails to cite any authority for its argument that New Phase 
cannot employ the statute to prove its claim that DAFCO LLC's deed is invalid and thus 
void. Research yields no authority stating that a subsequent creditor cannot present I. C. §32-
912 and its requirement that both spouses sign for a debt or it is void to prove that a prior 
creditor's invalid deed is void under the statute. The subsequent creditor is not attempting to 
gain an advantage over the community. Therefore, even though DAFCO LLC's Deed of 
Trust was recorded prior to the New Phase deeds, since Rebecca did not sign DAFCO LLC's 
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deed, it is void. By making this claim, New Phase gains no advantage over the community 
and it is preserved just as it would have been if one of the spouses had made the claim. 
Furthermore, if the court allows DAFCO LLC's invalid deed to hold a senior lien 
position to New Phase simply because DAFCO LCC recorded it first, it will have a chilling 
effect on business. If a lender cannot rely on the existing law when it engages in a 
transaction, it is likely that the lender will be more reluctant to lend money. Idaho Code §32-
912 is clear. A husband cannot encumber community property without his wife's written 
consent. The case law is clear. An attempt at such encumbrance is void. Therefore, this 
Court should hold that DAFCO LLC's deed is void because it bears only the signature of one 
spouse and cannot hold fll'St-position priority over the obligations made to New Phase. 
ll. DAFCO LLC's Judicial Admissions Prevent DAFCO LLC from Asserting the 
Validity of Its Deed of Trust. 
DAFCO LLC next argues that its statements from a different but related case are not 
judicial admissions which would be binding on DAFCO LLC. These statements are 
admissions which constitute "formal proof and possess the highest probative value because 
they are established beyond the need of evidence to prove them." Hill v. Fed Trade 
Comm'n.,124 F.2d 104, 106,34 F.T.C. 1800 (5th Cir. 1941); Barnes v. OwenswCorning 
Fiberglass Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 829 (6th Cir. 2000); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St. Louis 
Southwestern Co., 125 F.3d481, 483 (7thCir. 1997). In Bonneville County Case No. CV-10-
280, DAFCO LLC established in its verified complaint that its deed of trust required the 
signature ofRebecca which it did not bear. Therefore, DAFCO LLC has conclusively 
admitted that its deed is void and unenforceable since Rebecca did not sign it. 
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However. DAFCO LLC continues to rely on In re Universal Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 
751, 171 P.3d 242 (2007) and the court's findings that "judicial admissions do not include a. 
party's allegations in a complaint filed in a separate but related action." Id. at 759, 17l P.3d 
at 250. However, as noted in New Phase's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for,: . 
Continuance, that case must be distinguished from the present case because the present case 
deals with a verified complaint, which, unlike a regular complaint, has evidentiary value and 
the same force as an affidavit when presented in support of a motion for summary judgment. 
Camp v. Jimenez, 107 Idaho 878, 880, 693 P .2d 1080, 1082 (Ct. App. 1984). Since, the 
complaint in the instant case was a verified complaint, it should be considered a judicial 
admission since statements made within it can be considered by the court as evidence in the 
case. As a result of the court's finding that the statements made are judicial admissions, the 
admissions demonstrate the invalidity of the deed in question. 
m. Rebecca Jarvis has not Waived the Protections ofi.C. § 32-912 and is not 
Estopped from Challenging the Validity ofDAFCO LLC's Deed of Trust. 
A. Rebecca has not waived her rights under Idaho Code §32-912. 
Waiver is defmed as "the intentional relinquishment of a known right ... a voluntary 
act [that] implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some 
right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have demanded and insisted 
upon." Stoddardv. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191,207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009); Hecla 
Mining Co. v. Star·Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778,782 (1992) (citing Crouch v. 
Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364,368, 304 P.2d 646, 649 (1956)). For Rebecca to have waived her 
rights under I.C. §32-912 she would have had to engage in a voluntary act showing that she 
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relinquished her rights. Since she knew nothing about the transaction between SRF/DAFCO 
LLC she was unable to waive her right to sign (or choose not to sign) the promissory note 
and deed of trust. 
DAFCO LLC relies on Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 
1989) in its argument that Rebecca waived her rights under I. C. §32-912. In its briefing~ 
DAFCO LLC quotes to Lowry which states that "a party can waive the protect[ions] if his or 
her conduct is consistent with the existence and validity of the instrument. Id. at 711. In that 
case, the court held that Ms. Lowry had conducted herself in such a way that was consistent 
with the existenGe of a valid encumbrance because she had knowledge of the loan 
docmnents, had actually signed the~ and she and her husband had accepted the loan 
proceeds. Jd. No such evidence exists in the instant case. Rebecca knew nothing about the 
transaction. She signed no documents related to the SRF/DAFCO LLC loan. She never 
discussed it with her husband and neither SRF nor DAFCO LLC ever contacted her 
regarding the loan or the need for her signature on the loan documents. Therefore, DAFCO 
LLC's reliance on Lowry is misplaced because there is no evidence that Rebecca engaged in 
conduct which would have been consistent with the existence and validity of the loan. 
B. Rebecca shguld not be estop,ped from making a claim under Idaho Code §32-912. 
DAFCO LLC contends that Rebecca is estopped from making a claim under the two-
signature rule because she allegedly received a benefit from the transaction. However, 
DAFCO LLC fails to establish the additional elements for a claim of estoppel. 
Courts have consistently set forth the elements for a claim of estoppel in their 
opinions and include them in their analysis. They do not always specifically discuss each 
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element in detail but the elements of the test are conjunctively joined by 'and' which means 
that all elements must be satisfied in order for a claim for estoppel to stand. In its briefing, 
DAFCO LLC relies on Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480P.2d 896 (1971) in its claim for 
estoppel. This case clearly sets forth the elements of equitable estoppel: "1) conduct which 
amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or at least. which is 
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, 
those which the party subsequently attempts to assert, 2) intention, or at least expectation, 
that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party, 3) knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the real facts ... [a) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the 
truth to the facts [by the other party], 5) [the other party's] reliance upon the conduct, and 6) 
action [by the other party] based thereon of such a character as to change his position 
prejudicially." /d. at 53,480 P.2d at 899 (internal citations omitted). 
To show that the party to be estopped received a benefit is not enough to overcome 
summary judgment in this case. DAFCO LLC states that in Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep 
Ranch, 104 Idaho 301,658 P.3d 972 (1983) the court rejected the argument that the plaintiff 
had to show that that defendants had falsely represented or concealed a material fact in order 
to prove estoppel. Id. at 305, 658 P.3d at 976. However, the court nowhere explicitly rejects 
the frrst prong of the test. The court in that case simply restates the second half of the first 
prong when it reasons that "conduct from which acquiescence can be inferred may be 
sufficient to establish estoppel." !d. The court is rephrasing the text in the first element 
which states that the conduct of the non-consenting spouse must at least be found to be 
calculated to encourage the other party to rely on the statements made. In Calvin. the court 
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held the non-consenting spouses estopped from denying the validity of the contract when 
they had made no false representations, but knew of the negotiations, knew of the activity on · 
the property, and had made no objections to the transactions. I d. 
Contrasting that case with the instant case, Rebecca did not know about the 
SRF/DAFCO LLC deed of trust. Testimony given by Rebecca in her deposition is 
dispositive: 
Q. You indicated that you never met Jeff Avery of David Patterson? 
A. Correct 
Q. Did either of them ever attempt to contact you? 
A.No. 
Q. Did you ever provide any information to either of them or Snake River Fl.ll].d,ing? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you ever asked for any infonnation from them that you withheld from them? 
A.No. 
Q. Did you ever have any communication with them at all? 
A. None. 
Q. Let's go back through these checks that you went through just very quickly. 
Did you see any of those that were not signed by Josh? 
A.No. 
(R. Jarvis Depo. p. 35, ll. 9-25, p.36, 11. 1-2.) 
Rebecca did not know of any negotiations between SRF and her husband and to that 
end did not encourage anyone to enter into any transaction. There is no evidence that 
Rebecca engaged in conduct in making false representations or conduct where acquiescence 
can be inferred, that she intended for SRF/DAFCO LLC to enter into a transaction, that she 
had knowledge of any of the facts, or that SRF /DAFCO LLC lacked knowledge of the facts. 
Therefore, DAFCO LLC has not proved the elements of estoppel and have not succeeded on 
its claim to estop Rebecca from claiming her rights under I.C. §32-912. 
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IV. DAFCO LLC's Deed of Trust Provides Notice to No One. 
DAFCO LLC also contends that New Phase had actual-notice of the SRF/DAFCO 
LLC deed oftrust and cannot claim that the deed of invalid because of the lack of dual 
consent to the encumbrance of the property. DAFCO LLC continues to rely on Ralls v. 
Fouraker, 109 Idaho 488, 708 P.2d 893 (1985) and its holding that ''when a subsequent 
encumbrancer or purchaser ... has actual knowledge of a prior interest ... it make no 
difference whether the prior interest was properly acknowledged and recorded." I d. at 492, 
708 P.2d at 897. However, in that case the deed was a valid deed signed by all applicable 
parties as opposed to the instant case wh~re ~e geed is invalid for lack of dual consent in the 
encumbrance of community property. Because the deed in invalid, although it is in the 
county records, it is still void and only gives notice to other creditors that DAFCO LLC 
sought to take a security interest and failed to do so. Because the DAFCO LLC deed is void 
is in incapable of providing notice to anyone. 
DAFCO LLC further relies on similar cases Farm Bureau Finance Co., Inc. v. 
Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980) and Treasure Valley Bankv. Butcher, 117 Idaho 
974, 793 P.2d 206 (1990). In these cases, the acknowledgment of the party's signature was 
defective rendering the recordation incapable of giving constructive notice. However, the 
subsequent encumbrancer had actual knowledge of the other security interest which rendered, 
or created the possibility of rendering, its security interest inferior to the previously recorded 
encumbrancer. Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc., 100 Idaho at 748, Treasure Valley Bank, 111 
Idaho at 978. These cases are distinguishable from the instant case in that the deeds were 
defective in the notary acknowledgment, not the actual signatures of the parties. The court in 
Memorandum in Opposition to DAFCO LLC's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Support ofNew Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc. explicitly stated~ "Idaho has generally adhered to the view 
that substantial compliance with the statutory requirements regarding acknowledgments will 
suffice." Id. at749. 605 P.2d at 513 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 55-709)(2010)(emphasis 
,. . 
added)). The notary acknowledgement requirement is less stringent than the requirement of 
dual consent as referenced by both spouse's signatures on a document which encumbers 
community real property. I. C. §32-912 states that a deed is void if both spouse's do not sign, 
but I.C. §55-709 states that as long as the requirements for a notary acknowledgment are 
substantially complied with the document will suffice. Therefore, the cases relied upon by 
DAFCO LLC cannot be. used as precedent or persuasive authority in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, New Phase respectfully requests this Court to deny 
DAFCO LLC's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and grant summary judgment 
resolving this matter in favor of New Phase Investments. 
DATED: June z!:/_, 2010 . 
. A en 
eard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Memorandum in Opposition to DAFCO LLC's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Support ofNew Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
'i 
v 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-2010-651 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI-JARVIS, husband and wife, 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, DAFCO LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, 
INTERNALREVENUESERVICE, UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATION, a Utah corporation, NEILS & 
JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., 
a/k/a NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DAFCO's 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 
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DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
v. 
Counter-claimant/ cross~ 
claimant/third-party plaintiff 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC an 
Idaho limited liability company; 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA 
NITCHAELJARVIS;REBECCA 
JARVIS aka BECKY JARVIS aka 
REBECCA CHIAPPINI aka BECKY 
CIUAPPINI; STATE OF IDAHO; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
UNITED SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. 
d/b/a BOB'S INSULATION; NEILS & 
JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, 
INC., alk/a NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation 
Cross-defendants . 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOI\HvffiRS d/b/a S & H 
Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RUDY d/b/a 
Affordable Tile & Flooring; WADE 
ALLEN THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN 
CENTRAL VACUUM SYSTEMS; 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC.; an Idaho 
co oration; :MEDICAL RECOVERY 
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SERVICES, LLC an Idaho limited 
liability company; 
Third-Party Defendants. 
DAFCO LLC ("DAFCO"), pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 56( c), respectfully submits 
this reply brief in support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. As set forth below, and 
as argued in DAFCO's Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in Support ofDAFCO's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,1 DAFCO is entitled to 
foreclose a deed of trust recorded in Bonneville County on March 18, 2008 (the 
"SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust"). It is undisputed that the SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust was 
recorded prior to any of the deeds of trust under which New Phase claims priority. The SRF 
/DAFCO Deed of Trust has not been invalidated, nor has New Phase proposed any 
meritorious basis for invalidating it. Because the SRF I DAFCO Deed of Trust is in first 
position, this Cowt should enter the judgment requested in DAFCO's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
The SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust was recorded prior to New Phase's deeds of trust 
In order to defeat the plain application of Idaho Code § 55-606 (which gives priority to prior 
recorded conveyances), New Phase argues that the SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust is void. This 
position is not supported by Idaho Statute or Idaho Case law. By contrast, the legal authority 
1 Filed with this Court on June 9, 2010. 
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indicates that a deed such as DAFCO's- which admittedly is only signed by one of the 
members of the marital community- is valid until challenged by the community.2 In this 
case, it is undisputed that neither of the two members of the marital community, Joshua Jarvis 
and Rebecca Jarvis, have contested the validity of the SRF!DAFCO Deed of Trust. Thus, the 
SRF!DAFCO Deed of Trust is valid and DAFCO is entitled to Summary Judgment. 
1. The SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust is Not Void Under Idaho Code§ 32-912. 
New Phase is not in a position to challenge the validity of the deed under the provisions 
of Idaho Code§ 32-912. The Idaho Supreme Court has explicitly held that the statute exists 
for "the protection of the community." Finlayson v. Waller, 64 Idaho 618, 134 P.2d 1069 
(1943); accord Tewv. Manwaring, 94Idaho 50, 53,480 P.2d 896,899 (1971) ("[T]his statute 
was enacted for the purpose of protecting the community.") Brown v. Burnside, 94 Idaho 363, 
366,487 P.2d 957, 960 (1971) ("The statute exists for the protection of the wife's interest in 
the community ... "). The clear implication of these holdings is that the statute does not exist 
for the protection of third-party creditors such as New Phase. 
Moreover, the case law interpreting§ 32-912 indicates that the SRF /DAFCO Deed 
of Trust is valid. While the Idaho Code contains a general requirement that transfers of 
community property be signed by both members of a community, Idaho Code§ 32-912, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the provisions of the statute do not create 
"an inexorable rule." Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53,480 P.2d 896, 899 (1971). Idaho 
2 See DAFCO'S Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support ofDAFCO'S Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 12·15 for a discussion of the void/voidable distinction. 
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Courts have upheld conveyances made in derogation of the strict requirements ofidaho Code 
§ 32-912. See, e.g., Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Courts can invalidate a deed which does not comply with the statute when one of the members 
of the community challenges the validity of the deed, unless the community has waived the 
protections of§ 32-912. Keller v. Rogstad, 112 Idaho 484, 733 P .2d 705 (1987); Calvin v. 
Salmon River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 301, 658 P.2d 972 (1983). 
In this case, neither member of the marital community has challenged the validity of 
the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust. The Court has already entered judgment against Rebecca, 
finding that "any interest which Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis has in the real property at issue in 
this lawsuit, including a community property interest, is subordinate to the interest ... created 
~ 
by the DAFCO Deed of Trust." (Default Judgment (Rebecca Chiappini-Jarvis) at 4). New 
Phase's position that it is entitled to seek the protections ofidaho Code § 32-912, even though 
it is not a member of the marital community for whose benefit the statute was enacted, is not 
supported by Idaho legal authority. As a result, DAFCO is entitled to summary judgment 
upholding the validity of the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
2. New Phase's Judicial Admission Argument Fails as a Matter of Law. 
"A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attorney, in the course of 
judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof 
by the opposing party of some fact." In re Universal Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751, 759, 171 
P.3d 242, 250 (2007) (citation omitted). "A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, 
unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact within the party's peculiar knowledge, 
Reply Brief in Support of DAFCO' s Cross~ Motion for Summary Judgment PageS 
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not a matter of law .... [and] not opinion." "[W]e have held that judicial admissions do not 
include a party's allegation in a complaint filed in a separate but related lawsuit." !d. 
The statements to which New Phase points fail under each of the standards set forth 
in Universal Life.3 The statements in question are opinions about the legal significance of 
certain actions, not unequivocal statements regarding disputed facts. Moreover, the 
statements at issue were not made in this litigation. They were made in a separate but related 
lawsuit, Bonneville County Case No. CV -2010-280. Thus, New Phase's argument fails under 
the plain language of Universal Life. Despite New Phase's assertions, there is nothing in 
Universal Life which suggests that the applicability of the standards identified above varies 
in the case of a "verified complaint" as opposed to a "regular complaint." For these reasons, 
New Phase's judicial admission argument fails as a matter oflaw. 
3. Rebecca Jarvis has Not Disputed or Contested the Validity of the SRF/DAFCO 
Deed of Trust and Has Not Sought Protection Under Idaho Code§ 32-912. 
New Phase argues that Rebecca has not waived her rights under §32-912 and that she 
should not be estopped from doing so. As set forth in DAFCO's earlier brief, 4 the facts of this 
case demonstrate that Rebecca Jarvis received a benefit from the.SRF /DAFCO Deed ofT rust. 
Her conduct in accepting the benefit is consistent with the existence and validity of the 
SRFIDAFCO Deed of Trust. Such conduct is, under the rule set forth in Calvin v. Salmon 
3 See DAFCO's Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and in SupportofDAFCO's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment at 16-18 for more detailed explanation of why New Phase cannot prevail under the JudicialAdmission 
doctrine and also a discussion of why the Judicial Estoppel doctrine (which New Phase has not argued) does not invalidate the 
SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
4 See DAFCO's Brief in Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support ofDAFCO's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment at 18-22. 
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River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 301,658 P.2d 972 (1983), sufficient to demonstrate a waiver 
of the protections of§ 32-912. 
However, more fundamentally damaging to New Phase's case is the undisputed fact 
that Rebecca has not challenged or disputed the validity of the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust 
in this litigation. As New Phase notes,"[ w ]aiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of 
a known right or advantage. It is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense 
with something of value or forego some right or advantage .... " Stoddard v. Hagadone 
Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191,207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009). 
Rebecca was served with a copy ofDAFCO's Answer, Counterclaim, Cross-claim and 
Third-party Claim for Judicial Foreclosure of Deed of Trust ("Counterclaim").5 In the 
Counterclaim DAFCO alleges, inter alia, that "DAFCO is entitled to an order and decree that 
[Rebecca's] community property interest in the Property is encumbered by the DAFCO Deed 
ofT rust." (Counterclaim~ 61, 66.) Despite being aware ofthe existence ofthe SRF /DAFCO 
Deed of Trust, and of DAFCO's arguments that her interests are subordinate to the 
SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust, Rebecca has not challenged or disputed its validity. This Court 
has already entered judgment against her finding that the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust "is 
paramount in time and superior to any estate, right, title or claim of Cross-defendant, Rebecca 
Chiappini Jarvis." (DefaultJudgment (Rebecca Chiappini-J arvis) at 3.) The Court also found 
that "any interest which Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis has in the real property at issue in this 
5 A copy of the Affidavit of Service indicating that Rebecca was served with a copy of the Counterclaim was filed with 
the Court on March 26, 2010. 
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lawsuit, including a community property interest, is subordinate to the interest of the Cross-
claimant created by the DAFCO Deed of Trust." (Default Judgment (Rebecca Chiappini-
Jarvis) at 4.) 
By failing to contest the allegations in the Counterclaim, Rebecca Jarvis has voluntarily 
relinquished a known right or advantage. Thus, regardless of whether Rebecca has waived the 
protections of§ 32-912 by accepting a benefit from the SRF /DAFCO Deed ofT rust, she has 
failed to contest or dispute the validity of the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust and DAFCO's 
claim that its rights to the property at issue in this case are paramount to her rights. By 
choosing to not contest the validity of the SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust, knowing of the 
opportunity to do so, Rebecca has waived the protections of§ 32-912. 
4. New Phase Had Actual Knowledge of the SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust Prior to 
Receiving Any of The Deeds Under Which it Claims Priority. 
Throughout its summary judgment briefmg, New Phase has argued that it should 
prevail because recording the SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust did not provide New Phase with 
constructive knowledge. It is undisputed that the SRF /DAFCO Deed of Trust was recorded 
prior to any of the New Phase deeds at issue in this case. Thus, as a matter oflaw, New Phase 
had constructive knowledge of the DAFCO's prior encumbrance.6 Idaho Code§ 55-811. 
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the technical defect of not having both 
spouses sign prevented the recordation of the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust from giving 
constructive notice, New Phase is not entitled to summary judgment because it was aware of 
6 See DAFCO's Briefin Opposition to New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support ofDAFCO's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment at 12-16 for a more detailed explanation ofDAFCO's constructive notice argument. 
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the existence of the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust before receiving any of the deeds under 
which it now claims priority. When a subsequent encumbrancer has actual knowledge of a 
prior interest in the same property, the subsequent encumbrancer's interest is inferior to the 
prior interest. Treasure Valley Bank v. Butcher, 117 Idaho 974, 978, 793 P.2d 206, 210 
(1990). 
It is undisputed that New Phase had actual knowledge of the SRF/DAFCO Deed of 
Trust prior to taking its deeds of trust. New Phase was aware of the existence of the 
SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust as early as March or April of2008. (Criddle Aff. -u-u 11-12.) 
Later, in September of2008, the principals ofDAFCO and the principals ofNew Phase met 
to discuss the fact that the SRF/DAFCO Deed ofTrust was recorded first. (Criddle Aff. ~ 16.) 
Only in October and November of2008 did New Phase receive the deeds of trust under which 
it claims priority in this case. (Complaint at 7.) Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that 
New Phase had actual knowledge of the SRF /DAFCO Deed ofT rust prior to taking its deeds, 
New Phase's interest in the property at issue in this case is - as a matter of law - inferior 
to DAFCO's· interest in the same property. As a result, DAFCO is entitled to summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that the SRF/DAFCO Deed of Trust was recorded first. Neither 
member of the marital community has challenged the validity of the SRF/DAFCO Deed of 
Trust and New Phase has not provided any meritorious basis for invalidating it. For these 
Reply Brief in Support of DAFCO' s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Page9 
reasons this Court should deny New Phase's Motion for Summary Judgment and grant 
DAFCO's Cross-motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED: June 1, 2010 
CRAPO,PLLC 
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Attorneys for DAFCO, LLC and Snake River Funding, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA 
CHIAPPJNI-JARVIS, husband and wife, 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, DAFCO LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, UNITED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATION, a Utah corporation, NEILS & 
JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., 
a/k/a NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation 
Defendants. 
Order of Default (Rebecca Chiappini-Jarvis) 
Case No. CV-2010-651 
ORDER OF DEFAULT 
(REBECCA CHIAPPINI-JARVIS) 
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DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
v. 
Counter-claimant/cross-
claimant/third-party plaintiff 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC an 
Idaho limited liability company; 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA MICHAEL 
JARVIS; REBECCA JARVIS aka BECKY 
JARVIS aka REBECCA CHIAPPJNI aka 
BECKY CHIAPPINI; STATE OF IDAHO; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
UNITED SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a 
BOB'S INSULATION; NEILS & JOE'S 
LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., alk/a 
NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation 
Cross-defendants 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOMMERS d/b/a S & H Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RUDY d/b/a Affordable 
Tile & Flooring; WADE ALLEN 
THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN CENTRAL 
VACUUM SYSTEMS; BURNS 
CONCRETE, INC.; an Idaho corporation; 
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Order of Default (Rebecca Chiappini-Jarvis) Page2 
2 0 
IN TillS ACTION, the Cross-defendant, Rebecca Jarvis aka Becky Jarvis aka 
Rebecca Chiappini aka Becky Chiappini, having been regularly served with process, and 
having failed to appear and answer the Cross-claimant's Cross-claim on file herein, and 
the time allowed by law for answering having expired, upon application of Holden, 
Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, attorneys for the Cross-claimant, the default of the Cross· 
defendant, Rebecca Jarvis aka Becky Jarvis aka Rebecca Chiappini aka Becky Chiappini, is 
hereby ordered entered according to law. 
DATED this J¥day of April, 2010. 
Order of Default (Rebecca Chiappini-Jarvis} 
/s/ Gregory Anderson 
Gregory S. Anderson 
District Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
""l!lij). hereby certify that I am the clerk of the above-entitled court, and that on the 
_OtT_-'--~ ';day of April, 20 10 I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on 
the persons listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the 
same to be hand delivered. 
Persons Served: 
Karl R. Decker 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Jared W. Allen 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Rebecca Jarvis 
5022 Brennan Place 
Idaho Falls ID 83401 
Order ofDefault (Rebecca Chiappini-Jarvis) 
()Hand ~ail 
()Hand ~ail 
( ) Hand <foail 
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Attorneys for DAFCO LLC and Snake River Funding, Inc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSHUA M. JARVIS and REBECCA 
CHIAPPINI-JARVIS, husband and wife, 
SNAKE RIVER FUNDING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, DAFCO LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, UNJTED 
SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a BOB'S 
INSULATION, a Utah corporation, NEILS & 
JOE'S LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., 
a/k/a NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation 
Defendants. 
Default Judgment (Rebecca Chiappini~Jarvis) 
Case No. CV-2010-651 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
(Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis) 
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DAFCO LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
v. 
Counter-claimant/cross-
claimant/third-party plaintiff 
NEW PHASE INVESTMENTS LLC an 
Idaho limited liability company; 
Counter-defendant 
JOSH M. JARVIS aka JOSHUA MICHAEL 
JARVIS; REBECCA JARVIS aka BECKY 
JARVIS aka REBECCA CHIAPPINI aka 
BECKY CHIAPPINI; STATE OF IDAHO; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
UNITED SUBCONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a 
BOB'S INSULATION; NEILS & JOE'S 
LES SCHWAB TIRE STORE, INC., alk/a 
NEILS & JOE'S O.K. TIRE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation 
Cross-defendants 
AMERITITLE, INC., an Oregon 
corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
JOHN SOMMERS d/b/a S & H Plumbing; 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; RUSS RUDY d/b/a Affordable 
Tile & Flooring; WADE ALLEN 
THUESON d/b/a MOUNTAIN CENTRAL 
VACUUM SYSTEMS; BURNS 
CONCRETE, INC.; an Idaho corporation; 
MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
Third-Party Defendants. 
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The Cross-defendant, Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis, having been regularly served with 
process and having failed to appear and plead to the Cross-claim ofDAFCO LLC on file 
herein, and the time allowed by law for so pleading having expired and the default of said 
Cross-defendant having been duly entered, and it appearing that said Cross-defendant is 
not an infant or incompetent person and an affidavit of non-military service having been 
filed herein, and it appearing that Cross-claimant DAFCO LLC is entitled to a judgment 
herein; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Cross-claimant 
DAFCO LLC shall have judgment against Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis as follows: 
1. That the deed of trust in favor of DAFCO LLC identified in the Counterclaim, 
Cross-claim and Third-party Claim ofDAFCO LLC filed in this action (the 
"DAFCO Deed of Trust"), is paramount in time and superior to any estate, right, 
title or claim of Cross-defendant, Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis. 
2. That, as against Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis, the DAFCO Deed of Trust be 
foreclosed and that a ususal decree be made for the sale of the property by the 
sheriff of Bonneville County, Idaho, according to the law and practice of this 
Court; that the proceeds of the sale may be applied in payment of the amounts 
found in the action to be due DAFCO LLC on the Promissory Note secured by the 
DAFCO Deed of Trust; that Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis, and all persons claiming 
under her, subsequent to the execution and recording of the DAFCO Deed of 
Trust, either as purchasers, encumbrancers, or otherwise, be barred and foreclosed 
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from all right, claim or equity of redemption in and to the property and every part 
thereof, subject to the statutory right of redemption under Idaho Code § 45-113. 
3. That DAFCO LLC or any party to this proceeding may become a purchaser at 
such sale; that DAFCO LLC be allowed to make a credit bid at such sale in any 
amount not exceeding the total judgment amount found in this action to be due on 
the Promissory Note secured by the DAFCO Deed of Trust; that the sheriff 
execute a deed and certificate of sale to the purchaser; that the purchaser be let 
into possession of the property on production of the certificate of sale thereof. 
4. That any interest which Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis has in the real property at issue 
in this lawsuit, including a community property interest, is subordinate to the 
interest of the Cross-claimant created by the DAFCO Deed of Trust. 
DATED this (jff' day ofMay, 2010. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,,:M.) hereby certify that I am the clerk of the above-entitled court, and that on the 
;;t6" day ofMay, 2010 I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on 
the persons listed below by mailing~ with the correct postage thereo~ or by causing the 
same to be hand delivered. 
Persons Served: 
Charles A. Homer 
Karl R. Decker 
Daniel C. Dansie 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC 
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Jared W. Allen 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Rebecca Chiappini Jarvis 
5052 Brennan Place 
Idaho Falls ID 83401 
COURTESY COPY TO: 
Fred Cooper, Esq. 
770 S. Woodruff Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
G:\WPOATA\CAH\15394- Su:wart Tille'IFlle 4\1£ Pleadingl cv~2010-65!\DEFAULT, Chllppini JUDO.Wpd 
Default Judgment (Rebecca Chiappini-Jarvis) 
rl ( ) Hand Delivery ( ) Facsimile 
~ ( ) Hand Delivery ( ) Facsimile 
yMail ( ) Hand Delivery ( ) Facsimile 
i 
I Mail ( ) Hand Delivery ( ) Facsimile 
Clerk 
Page 5 
248 
Corrected 
Clerk's Record 
Removed pages 
249-316 from 
Binder 2 of 4 
